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ABSTRACT
Business Process Modelling Using Model Checking And The Theory Of Constraints
M. J. Odendaal
Department of Industrial Engineering,
University of Stellenbosch,
Private Bag X1, Matieland 7602, South Africa.
Thesis: MScEng (Industrial)
March 2010
Concurrent and distributed business processes are becoming the norm in many organisations.
Current modelling techniques do not address the problems faced by concurrent business processes
sufficiently. We show how model checking is applied to business processes to prove behavioural prop-
erties to address the aforementioned shortcomings.
A method of abstraction is required to construct business process models that can be model
checked. In this thesis we show the suitability of the Logical Thinking Process as an abstraction tool.
We call the combination of the Logical Thinking Process and model checking the Complexity Al-
leviation Method (CAM). We apply CAM to two well-known supply chain and manufacturing prob-
lems, and insightful results are obtained. This leads us to the conclusion that CAM allows for the
quicker modelling of business processes, as well as providing problem-specific and proven solutions
in a manner not possible with simulation or other techniques.
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UITTREKSEL
Besigheidsproses-modellering Met Model Verifikasie En Die Teorie Van Beperkinge
(“Business Process Modelling Using Model Checking And The Theory Of Constraints”)
M. J. Odendaal
Departement Bedryfsingenieurswese,
Universiteit van Stellenbosch,
Privaatsak X1, Matieland 7602, Suid Afrika.
Tesis: MScIng (Bedryfs)
Maart 2010
Gelyklopende en verspreide besigheidsprosesse word ’n alledaagse verskynsel in menigte instan-
sies. Huidige modelleringstegnieke is nie in staat om die probleme geassosieer met gelyklopende
besigheidsprosesse aan te spreek nie. Ons wys hoe model model verifikasie (“model checking”) toe-
gepas word op besigheidsprosesse om gedragseienskappe te bewys en sodoende die voorgenoemde
tekortkominge aan te spreek.
’n Metode van abstraksie word benodig om besigheidsprosesmodelle, wat verifieerbaar is, te kon-
strueer. In hierdie verhandeling word die geskiktheid van die Logiese Denkproses (“the Logical Thin-
king Process”) as abstraksie gereedskap aangetoon.
Ons noem die kombinasie van die Logiese Denkproses en model verifikasie Kompleksiteitsverlig-
tingsmetodologie (CAM). Ons pas CAM op twee welbekende aanbodketting- en vervaardigingspro-
bleme toe en insiggewende resultate is verkry. Dit lei ons tot die gevolgtrekking dat CAM vinniger
konstruering van modelle te weeg bring, sowel as probleem spesifieke en bewysbare oplossings ver-
skaf wat nie moontlik is met simulasie of ander tegnieke nie.
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INTRODUCTION
C
ONCURRENT and distributed business processes are becoming the norm in many organisa-
tions. This adds speed and reach in an organisation’s operation but does come at a potential
price. Synchronisation and fault identification are far more complicated in these circum-
stances when compared to traditional serial operations. This problem has, however, been addressed
with a technique known as model checking, and we will show how to address the challenges faced in
corporate operations, and the benefits that are derived from using this technique.
1.1 Motivation
Organisations are required to respond quickly to changes in their environment, whilst the environ-
ment itself is also in a state of constant flux. Environments consist of global markets that require
global operations and reach. Products and services are required to appeal to a global market but have
to satisfy local regulations and preferences whilst adhering to cost constraints. Greater integration
throughout the supply chain is demanded while outsourcing services. Product turnaround times are
constantly shrinking requiring more to be done in less time.
One way of dealing with change is with modelling and simulation. The use of models allows
us to conduct “what if” scenarios, without the cost and implications associated with implementing
changes in a real-world system. The use of models and simulation has allowed for faster, more cost
effective, and reliable solutions to be produced. Business processes and protocols (the focus of this
thesis) have benefited as well from the use of simulation. In the context of business process behaviour
investigation, modelling and simulations have two significant drawbacks: firstly, the inability of a
simulation to prove model properties and, secondly, the difficulty of modelling concurrent processes
1
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 2
accurately.
The first problem stems from how information regarding behaviour and system properties is
gathered with simulation. A model is subjected to a simulation run, which is a random sequence
of events generated to imitate real conditions. This run is then sampled to gain the required informa-
tion. Simulation produces statistically inferred information on the behaviour of a system by taking
a significant subset of all possible model executions and reporting these figures back to the user.
Though sufficient to make comments in general, simulation is not capable of proving model proper-
ties [2; 3], simply because it did not observe every instance of model behaviour that is possible. In the
event that not all eventualities are observed there always remains a possibility that a major anoma-
lous event can occur. We are capable of identifying and eliminating frequently occurring problems in
systems. So it is these infrequent and anomalous events that we desire to eliminate from the system;
something we are not capable of doing with current methods.
Concurrent processes are difficult to prove as error free with traditional methods. This poses a
serious problem to business processes, which are becoming ever more concurrent. This problem
is not always fully appreciated. We deal with issues of concurrency on a daily basis, competing for
resources like food and checkout clerks, negotiating traffic intersections, or competing for parking
slots. There are written, and unwritten rules on how to approach these concurrent problems, but they
are, however, not foolproof. For example, had the rules of driving1 been foolproof there would not be
any vehicle accidents on our roads. As business processes become more concurrent it is necessary
that the rules that govern them are able to deal with this increased complexity. In addition to this,
certain systems require protocols and rules that function flawlessly.
1.2 Solution framework and components
The issues with the use of simulations to prove model properties formally and address concurrency
problems have been raised. A method used to solve these problems is called model checking. Instead
of exploring only a subset of the model’s operations space, like simulation, model checking examines
all eventualities. By doing so it does not infer properties but proves them formally. In addition to this,
model checking is well suited to the validation and verification of concurrent processes and protocols.
The benefits of model checking do, however, come at a price. Since all possible iterations of model
execution and behaviour are evaluated, as opposed to what occurs with simulation, the verification
of models with model checking are computationally expensive and memory intensive.
It is of great importance to construct models that are as abstract as possible. Normal model check-
ing focus areas are hardware, circuits, and data communication protocols; as a result, the specifica-
tion language used to describe these protocols is, as formal and as rigid as the applications it is usually
1Driving is a concurrent activity if more than one vehicle is involved, and this is typically the case on any road where
the rules needs to be obeyed.
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used for. Despite this, business processes can, and have been specified as well as verified successfully
using formal languages.
However, due to its computational overhead it is generally prohibitive to model most business
processes in their totality. In addition to this, organisations consist of more that just business pro-
cesses. Though business processes can be specified formally, the additional components that make
up an organisation may not. These components my involve entities such as emotions and company
politics; issues that do not translate into formal protocols. A means is therefore needed to abstract
the formal specification from an informal business process so that it can be model checked.
This abstraction is achieved with the use of the Logical Thinking Process. The Logical Thinking
Process forms part of the Theory Of Constraints (TOC) tool-set and is used to identify the root cause of
problems observed in systems and organisations. It takes both the formal and the informal aspects of
the systems and the associated problems and reduces them into a single focal point for improvement.
This output, provided by the Logical Thinking Process, is both formal and highly abstract in nature,
making it ideally suited for use in conjunction with model checking.
1.3 Objectives
The aim of this work is to apply model checking to business processes in order to prove the be-
havioural properties of the proposed solutions. The verification and modelling of concurrent busi-
ness processes are also major objectives since simulation does not address the problem sufficiently.
A method of abstraction is required to build verifiable models to accomplish the above-mentioned
objectives. We will show the suitability of the Logical Thinking Process as an abstraction and analysis
tool. We will also show it being able to represent intricate and complex processes in a highly abstract
manner suitable for model checking. In order to be viewed as a success, the combination of model
abstraction and verification must yield new insights into established and understood solutions, as
well as demonstrate additional properties that are not present under current simulation methods.
1.4 Thesis outline
The rest of this document is constructed as follows. Chapter 2 describes the Logical Thinking Pro-
cesses as well as components of TOC used in the abstraction of models. Chapter 3 provides a brief
overview on model checking and describes concepts of the field that will be used in this thesis. Both
the Logical Thinking Process and model checking are then combined into a unified methodology
for problem identification, abstraction, solution generation model construction, and verification in
Chapter 5. This is followed by two implementations of the methodology in Chapters 6 and 7.
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THE THEORY OF CONSTRAINTS
2.1 Short overview of characteristics
To understand the ideas presented in this thesis, a brief and selective overview is given below of the
Theory of Constraints (TOC) and related tools.
TOC is a management philosophy that teaches how to improve an organisation’s effectiveness
in reaching its goals by understanding and eliminating the underlying causes that limit a company
in achieving its objectives. Originally developed by Goldratt, it became popular through a series of
“business-based” novels [4; 5; 6; 7; 8]. It has gradually moved from its original focus on production
and operations management (a so-called hard method) to a general approach that covers all aspects
of business (now a soft method). It has been described by Goldratt as “an overall theory for running an
organisation” [9, p. 453]. Although it may appear mercantile, unscientific, or common-sensical, TOC
has found a place in the academic Operations Research/Management Science (OR/MS) communica-
tion; Davies [10] and Rahman [11] survey the work around it.
2.1.1 TOC background
The aim of TOC is business improvement. It initially focused on the improvement of manufactur-
ing, as set out in the business novel The Goal. Goldratt describes in this novel the assumptions and
principles on which later TOC work is built.
Every system has an objective, and every system has constraints. To improve a system the ob-
jective or “Goal” of the system must be defined, as well as its constraints. It is important to realise
that constraints that inhibit a system are contextual in terms of the system goal. This means that the
lack of comfortable seating in Boeing 747 passenger jets is a constraint, whilst the same situation in
4
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a Boeing 747 cargo plane is not. According to TOC, the biggest improvement in a system comes from
eliminating the largest constraint, or that which inhibits the system the most from achieving its goal.
Improving a system with TOC uses the assumption that systems are subject to the laws of cause
and effect. What happens in one section of a system has an impact on the other sections of the
system. More importantly, the impact is —to a large extent— predictable and even quantifiable. If
this assumption holds, multiple negative effects can be attributed to a common or root cause, and
TOC can improve performance.
2.1.2 The five focusing steps
Improvement in TOC is viewed as a continuous process, which is formalised in an algorithm known
as the “five focusing steps”:
1. Identify the most serious constraint.
2. Decide how to exploit the constraint.
3. Subordinate all other processes to the decision in step 2.
4. Elevate the constraint.
5. Re-evaluate the situation by returning to Step 1. Do not let inertia become the constraint.
The steps are explained in The Goal with the example of a father taking his son’s scout troop
camping, and solving the problems faced during the hike. The first aim of the hike is reaching the
campsite safely, and on time. From the outset some kids start to race ahead of the troop and some
lag behind. This makes supervision of all the children difficult, and the pace is too slow to reach the
campsite before dark.
The first step is to identify the constraint. For example, in the case of the troop the constraint is
Herby, the slowest of all the kids. Exploiting the constraint means ensuring that Herby keeps walking.
Every moment that Herby stops is a moment that the troop cannot make up, since he is the slowest.
Subordinating all other processes, Herby is placed at the front of the troop. This ensures that all
kids walk together. Elevating the constraint further, Herby’s backpack is removed and the weight is
distributed amongst the rest of the troop. Herby now sets the pace for the troop and when he walks
faster, everybody else walks faster. All effort has focused on Herby until he is no longer the slowest kid
in the troop, and now the process can start over again.
2.2 The Logical Thinking Process
In this thesis the component of TOC used most frequently is the Logical Thinking Process. In essence,
it is a form of formalised common sense to graphically describe the cause-and-effect relationships
within a system.
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The purpose of the Logical Thinking Process is to describe different states that the system is, or
could be, in (either the current, past or future states of the system), in order to identify, exploit, pro-
mote and elevate the largest constraint.
It was first introduced in It’s not Luck and later further formalised in Thinking For A Change [12].
According to Dettmer [13], the entire Logical Thinking Process comprises six diagrams each, built in
the same way. The construction method is explained in Section 5.2.1. The diagrams are:
1. the Intermediate Objectives Map,
2. the Current Reality Tree,
3. the Evaporating or Conflict Cloud,
4. the Future Reality Tree,
5. the Prerequisite Tree, and
6. the Transition Tree.
In this work we use only the Current Reality Tree (CRT), the Conflict Cloud, and the Future Reality
Tree (FRT).
2.2.1 The Current Reality Tree
The CRT is used to answer the question “what to change”, the Conflict Cloud and FRT “what to change
to”.
As its name suggests, the CRT diagram describes the current reality in the system that is being
improved. The aim of the diagram is to locate the largest constraint in the system. This is done by
taking three to five problems faced by the system and finding the relationships that exist between
them.
This process relies on the assumption stated in Section 2.1.1 that multiple problems can be related
to a common or root cause. It is this root cause that is the largest constraint and will be the focus of
improvement.
Let us construct the CRT given in Figure 2.1 of the scout troop example. The problems faced were
that it was difficult to supervise the kids, and that the campsite would not be reached before dark.
These two undesirable effects (UDEs) are marked in red.
The first UDE, that the troop is hard to supervise, is due to the distance between Mike in the front,
and Herby at the back. The reason for the distance is the combination of three things. Mike walks the
fastest, Herby walks the slowest, and everybody is allowed to walk at their own pace. This results in a
large distance between the first and the last kid, and makes the troop hard to supervise.
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The troop is 
hard to 
supervise
Mike walks the 
fastest
Everybody is 
allowed to walk 
at their own 
pace
The troop will 
not make the 
campsite by 
sunset
The slowest 
member of the troop 
will not make the 
campsite by sunset
Everybody must 
arrive at the 
campsite by 
sunset
Herby walks the 
slowest
There is a lot of 
distance 
between Mike 
at the front and 
Herby at the 
back 
Herby will not 
arrive at the 
campsite by 
sunset
Figure 2.1: The CRT of the scout troop hike
Changing any of these three entities will impact the supervision UDE. Asking Mike to walk slower
will reduce the space and make the troop easier to supervise. Slowing Herby down will, however,
make the problem worse.
The second UDE is explained in the same way. It would not matter if most of the kids reach the
campsite before sunset; unless all the members of the troop arrive before sunset, the whole troop has
not arrived. So Herby must make the campsite before sunset.
The CRT answers “what to change” by identifying the entity that affects all UDEs. You will impact
at least one UDE by touching any of the entities in the CRT, but only one (in this case) will affect them
all. This is the root cause, and the focus of improvement. In the case of the scout troop example, the
root cause is Herby’s speed, and all efforts for improvement will centre around it.
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2.2.2 The Conflict Cloud
Having identified the root cause as the speed at which Herby walks in the CRT, we now focus on “what
to change to”. A conflict arises when dealing with Herby’s speed problem. This conflict is depicted in
Figure 2.2.
We arrive on time 
and safely at the 
campsite
Herby walks 
slowly
Herby walks 
faster
We do not upset 
members of the 
troop
Have an 
enjoyable hike
Figure 2.2: The conflict cloud of Herby’s slow walking pace
The aim of the hiking trip would ultimately be to enjoy it. For that to happen the troop must arrive
safely and on time at the campsite. This requires Herby to walk faster. Enjoying the hike is far easier if
all of the members of the troop are happy. Placing undue pressure on Herby to walk faster, or on the
other kids to walk slower can jeopardise this. So we must allow Herby to walk at his own pace.
This leads to a conflict. To enjoy the hike Herby must walk faster, and to enjoy the hike he must
walk at his own pace. The aim is to find how to solve this apparent contradiction, and the key to the
solution lies in the assumptions used to construct Figure 2.2. We assume that if we force Herby to
walk faster he will become unhappy. This is possibly true. The question is how do we make Herby
walk faster but still keep everybody happy?
Two possible actions can solve this problem. One, placing Herby at the front of the troop, and
two, lightening Herby’s load. This provides us with a feasible solution that will address all our UDEs
identified in the CRT.
2.2.3 The Future Reality Tree
After having generated feasible solutions with the Conflict Cloud it is helpful to see what impact these
solutions will have on the system.
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Placing Herby in the front of the troop, as mentioned, ensures that Herby walks as fast as possible,
since he sets the pace. Herby is also carrying a heavy backpack. Redistributing the weight between
other members of the troop will speed Herby up automatically. Both of these actions move us closer
to both our goal of having an enjoyable hike and removing the UDEs in the CRT.
We can depict this in the form of an FRT and an example of an FRT for the scout troop is given in
Figure 2.3.
The troop is 
easy to 
supervise
Everybody 
walks behind 
Herby
The troop will 
make the 
campsite by 
sunset
Everybody must 
arrive at the 
campsite by 
sunset
Herby walks 
faster
The troop 
walks together 
Herby will arrive 
at the campsite 
by sunset
We place Herby 
in front of the 
troop
We redistribute 
the weight of 
Herby's backpack
Figure 2.3: The FRT once we increased Herby’s pace
Similar to the CRT, the FRT is used to describe the future state of the system. The FRT is used to
assess both the positive and negative impact of a proposed solution before it is implemented. It is
done to save effort during implementation and to prevent worsening of the current situation.
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2.2.4 Necessity versus sufficiency
The Logical Thinking Process relies on the concepts of necessity and sufficiency. The difference be-
tween the concept can be described in terms of building a house. Necessity conditions would be
steel, sand, cement and bricks; without these elements building cannot start. Their absence would
be deemed as“show stoppers”. Steel, sand, cement, and bricks are, however, not sufficient to build a
home. Roofing, wiring and paint, as well as numerous other items are required before a structure is
sufficient to be called a house.
The CRT and FRT are sufficiency structures; consequently we will not be focusing on the necessity
issues in this thesis since their associated diagrams are not used in the scope of the work.
The Logical Thinking Process describes the process of constructing the above-mentioned dia-
grams in detail. The process, like the examples demonstrate, remains informal and subjective, yet
reduces the system to a single specify-able focus point. It takes the informal aspects of the system
into account, like the troops feelings and enjoyment of the hike, and processes them into concrete
and tangible properties that can be modelled, reducing emotions and physical considerations into a
single focus; in the case of this example, Herby’s speed.
The creation of any model requires abstraction on the part of the modeller. As a result models are
subjective representations of the perception and implementation preferences imparted to it by its
creator. The representations that are formulated for the same reality will not be the same for different
constructions with the use of the Logical Thinking Process. These representations will differ depend-
ing on who constructs them, and will vary from analysis to analysis depending on who performs it.
Nevertheless, the guidelines provided by the Logical Thinking Process aids in the creation of faithful
representations of reality in a manner that would not be possible without that use.
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MODEL CHECKING OVERVIEW
M
ODEL checking is used to prove that system models are error free. This chapter describes
how model checking operates and how it establishes that a system is functioning prop-
erly. It follows Inggs [1] closely and describes what model checking is, what tools and
languages we use in this thesis and how to apply them.
3.1 Introduction to model checking
It is important that systems function properly. A system that fails, or performs poorly, inevitably
results in problems. These problems range from mild irritation to life threatening conditions, and
can cause damage, cost money or lives. As a result, the effective identification of defects is important.
One of the main methods to identify defects and demonstrate the correctness of a system is by
testing. Testing involves the observation of the behaviour of an active system under a specific set of
conditions and inputs. Though effective under the right circumstances, testing has its limits. Testing
is biased, especially towards frequently occurring problems or scenarios. To ensure that a system
is defect free, all possible executions of the system must be checked under all possible conditions.
Accomplishing this with an active system requires additional controls and computational overheads
that make it infeasible. Testing is also difficult in concurrent systems. These systems may have subtle
timing and synchronisation issues and total process control may not always be possible.
Model checking addresses these problems. It does not require a running system to operate. Sys-
tem design behaviour is modelled and interpreted without an implementation. It also covers all pos-
sible system execution paths, so inconspicuous and subtle defects are detectable. Model checking
is especially useful for the evaluation of concurrent systems that are difficult (or even impossible) to
11
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
CHAPTER 3. MODEL CHECKING OVERVIEW 12
evaluate with more direct testing.
These properties allow model checking to be used early on in the development process. There-
fore, model checking can detect even subtle defects in a specification without having a physical sys-
tem implementation. This makes defects easier and cheaper to rectify.
3.2 The model checking process
In the past, model checking has been used mainly for communication protocols, concurrent pro-
cesses and safety critical systems. These systems consist of interacting components that execute
concurrently by exchanging data or messages. One can draw a parallel between the aforementioned
systems and normal business processes. This is left for Section 3.5.
In order for a system to be verified, the model checker requires two separate components: firstly
a formal specification of the system itself, defining its behaviour, structure and interactions and sec-
ondly, a formal specification of each desired or undesired system behaviour. With the model spec-
ification and behaviour requirements specified the model checker can evaluate if the specification
adheres to the stated behavioural requirements. After the completion of the evaluation the model
checker provides a “yes” or “no” response to whether or not the model provably adheres to these be-
haviour specifications. A “no” response is also complimented with a counter example on how the
system failed.
It is important to note that the verification of a system for a given set of properties does not imply
that the system is free from defects or potential malfunctions. All that the verification demonstrates
is that the system specification provably adheres to the specified behaviour requirements. For ex-
ample, verifying that a system is free from deadlock does not prove that the same system will be free
from starvation. The primary aim of model checking is to detect errors that are difficult to find un-
der normal circumstances. The verification of a system’s adherence to certain properties improves
confidence that the behaviour of the system will be correct.
Model checking proves the adherence of a system to a property or a set of properties by evaluating
all possible executions that can take place. This is possible because such systems usually consist of a
finite set of states.
Having discussed on an abstract level how model checking works, it is beneficial to take a closer
look at how to define system behaviour, verification requirements and the verification thereof.
3.3 The model checker SPIN
There are numerous model checking tools available. In this work we will be using the model checker
SPIN (Simple PROMELA Interpreter)[14]. SPIN is an open source tool that has been successfully used
to model check business processes; the final aim of this work. The combination of a free tool with
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proven abilities to accomplish the intended task, in combination with locally available knowledge
resulted in the adoption of SPIN as the model checker for this project.
SPIN is a verification system developed by Bell Labs in the eighties and nineties and is distributed
freely on the Web.1 It is also one of the widest used logical model checkers in the world, employed by
both academia and industry alike. In 2002, ACM (the Association for Computing Machinery) awarded
SPIN its Software System Award; its most prestigious accolade. This recognises SPIN as truly break-
through software: systems such as UNIX, TEX, Smalltalk, Postscript, TCP/IP and Tcl/Tk, are all previ-
ous laureates of the award.
SPIN will be used as a black box solution that is able to verify a model’s adherence to the specified
properties. A deeper understanding of how this is accomplished is not required since the concepts
presented in this work only require a high-level understanding of the tool. The inputs and outputs of
the tool, however, require explanation. An authoritative overview of the tool can be found in the work
done by Holzmann [14].
3.4 System behaviour specification
Often the behaviour of systems is represented by state-transition diagrams, which is a graphic repre-
sentation of a finite-state machine (FSM). An FSM consists of the basic states that a system can find
itself in and the actions that will result in the transition from one state to another. The state of a sys-
tem is typically the combination of the states of the different subsystems, as well as the values of all
global variables.
As an example of an FSM, let us examine the simple alternating bit protocol. The system is made
up of two separate sub-processes; a sender and a receiver. They communicate via a single channel
across which messages can be sent. This is depicted in Figure 3.1.
1
32
4
receive a1
send m0 send m1
receive a0
Sender
1
32
4
send a1
receive m0 receive m1
send a0
Receiver
Figure 3.1: Sub-process state-transition diagrams of an alternating bit protocol [1]
1SPIN, as well as additional literature, can be downloaded from spinroot.com
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Each process has four states, and the states are numbered. The processes are initialised and start
off in state 1. From there the sender transmits m0 (a message with the value 0) over the channel and
moves to state 2. Upon receiving m0 the receiver process moves over to state 2. Once in state 2 the
receiver replies over the channel with a0 (an acknowledgement of receiving the value 0 sent by the
receiver). This in turn moves the sender to state 3, and so on. The communication channel is also
“lossy” so messages that are transmitted are not always delivered.
Systems that have a finite set of states can be evaluated by SPIN. The combination of all these
different states is called the global state space. Each state in the global state space contains three
components: one each for states of the sender and receiver, and one for the contents of the commu-
nication channel (e in this case denotes an empty channel). The global state transition diagram is
shown in Figure 3.2.
1, 1, e
2, 1, m0
2, 1, e 2, 2, e
2, 3, a0
2, 3, e 3, 3, e
4, 3, m1
4, 3, e 4, 4, e
4, 1, a1
4, 1, e
send m0
lose m0 receive m0
send a0
send m1
send a1
lose a0
lose m1
lose a1
receive a0
receive m1
receive a1
Figure 3.2: Global state-space diagram of the alternating bit protocol shown in Figure 3.1 [1]
To specify large systems accurately in FSM form would be impractical, or at least very difficult.
High level formalisms are used to specify systems for model checking in a similar manner as pro-
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gramming languages are used for software development. As a result, model checkers often provide
high-level formalisms in order to specify model behaviour, including PROMELA, SMV, SAL, ESML and
Rainbow. In this work we will use PROMELA.
3.4.1 PROMELA
PROMELA is an acronym for Process Meta-Language. The use of meta in the name of the specification
language is significant, since it is designed to facilitate the abstraction of the system when modelling.
The emphasis is placed on the modelling of process synchronisation and co-ordination, not how the
computation of the process will be done. The structure of PROMELA is devoid of the concept of time or
a system clock. There are also no floating point numbers and only a limited number of computational
functions.
PROMELA models are made from the following components:
• asynchronous processes
• buffered and unbuffered message channels
• synchronisation statements
• structured data.
The component limitations mentioned above, and the lack of common functions and data types
like floating point numbers, make an ordinary task of computing a square root impossible with PROMELA
and SPIN. Modelling the behaviour of clients and servers in a network environment is, by contrast, a
trivial operation. These attributes also aid in the use of PROMELA in the modelling of business pro-
cesses, since it was not designed for computation, but for system specification.
3.4.2 Correctness properties
Correctness properties specify the desired and undesired aspects of a system. If a systems adheres to
the desired aspects and shows itself to be free from undesired properties, it can be considered capable
of meetings its design objectives. The verification of a system hinges on theses properties, and they
themselves are as important as the model that is verified.
Correctness properties are separated into two main categories, namely safety and liveness prop-
erties. The basic distinction between the two is that a safety property defines that something unde-
sirable will never happen. A liveness property on the other hand, states that something desirable will
invariably happen.
SPIN’s correctness properties are specified using temporal logic. There are two well-known types
of temporal logic, namely branching time temporal logic and linear time temporal logic [1]. Compu-
tation Tree Logic is an example of the former and Linear Time Logic (LTL) of the latter. The examples
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
CHAPTER 3. MODEL CHECKING OVERVIEW 16
Table 3.1: LTL grammar[15]
f::= p
| true
| false
| (f )
| f binop f
| unop f
unop ::=  always
| ♦ eventually
| ! logical negation
binop ::= U strong until
| && logical and
| || logical or
| → implication
| ↔ equivalence
in this document will, however, only use LTL, since it is the logic which PROMELA employs to specify
correctness claims. Correctness properties are specified using LTL grammar. This grammar can be
found in Table 3.1.
If one takes the alternating bit protocol depicted in Figure 3.2 as an example, a liveness property
would be that in the event that the sender sends a message with the value 0, the sender will at some
later point receive an acknowledgement of that message also with the value 0. This can be expressed
in LTL as
(m0 →♦a0). (3.1)
A common safety property for concurrent systems is freedom from deadlock. The protocol given in
Figure 3.2 does not include error detection. In the event that the channel loses a message the system
is stuck in deadlock. This can be seen in the example by inspection. In the event that a message gets
lost, the system will enter into one of the four states that have no outgoing edges, such as state (2,1,e).
If the system enters one of these states it becomes stuck, hence the term deadlock.
3.5 Model checking for business processes
The work as presented in this thesis applies model checking outside of communication protocol de-
velopment and safety critical systems. Interesting application examples of model checking include
work by Bäumler et al [16], subjecting medical guidelines to verification. Koehler et al [17] make a
well-defined case regarding the need for model checking in business processes and the benefits that
they can bring to a system in terms of reliability and flexibility.
Business processes contain communication protocols between departments, and often many of
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the components of a business system is safety critical. Model checking offers benefits to both these
issues and has therefore been applied to verify business processes in the past. The bulk of the work
in the field was done by the Telematics Institute during the Testbed Project [18]. The aim of the
project was to devise a method that would make model checking accessible to “managers”— or non-
technical users —an audience that would otherwise be deprived of the benefits that model checking
has to offer.
The Testbed Project resulted in the development of the BIZZDesigner software package, allowing
a user-friendly GUI interface for business modelling using model checking. Eertink[19] and Janssen
[18; 20] documents the challenges of design abstraction and graphical modelling of business pro-
cesses for verification.
The approach to address the challenge of abstraction in business processes was done by means
of the specification of a formal graphical language called Amber. Amber is a stricter specification
than PROMELA; this is done to ensure that models remain of verifiable complexity. This does reduce
the flexibility and type of models that can be verified, since they firstly have to adhere to Amber. In
addition to this, BIZZDesigner does not allow for the specification of correctness claims directly in
LTL. It has a specification builder built in that allows users to verify models only for one property at a
time. These techniques make the benefits of model checking available to business process modelling,
but do so in a limited manner.
3.6 Business process modelling and meta-modelling
There are numerous approaches to business process modelling and a wealth of work has been done
in the field. Lu [21] presents a comparative survey on the field and divides the approaches of the field
into two categories, graph-based, and rule-based modelling. The graph-based approach derives its
roots from graph theory. The rule-based approach is based on formal logic. Model checking as it is
used in this work comprises both these elements, and can therefore not be grouped with either of
these approaches exclusively. It is in this duplicity that the potential of model checking resides when
compared to other techniques.
Within the field of business process modelling numerous keywords are shared with model check-
ing. Concepts like verification and validation do imply the exact same concepts in both domains. In
this work we will use the concepts from the model checking domain.
Validation Validation is the process of ensuring that the model which is constructed is a true re-
flection of reality. Validation ensures that the specification drawn up for a product or project is a true
reflection of what is desired. In the event that a customer ordered a jet-propelled aircraft, validation
of the project would ensure that he/she does not receive a propeller variant.
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Verification Verification is the process of ensuring that the constructed model is a true representa-
tion of what was intended to be designed. Verification ensures that the project is completed correctly.
In a sense it debugs the validated specification by ensuring that there are no logical inconsistencies
and that the project would indeed achieve its objectives. Verification ensures that once the process
of developing a jet aircraft for a client has started, the client will receive a working jet.
In short, validation answers the question “are we building the right product?”, while verification
answers the question “are we building the product right?”
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RESEARCH PROBLEM
T
HE introduction of changes into a business process can lead to unpredictable results. The
results of changes in systems that are complex, concurrent, distributed, non-sequential and
interdependent are even less predictable. To mitigate this uncertainty, models are built that
describe these changes, and predict the results they will have. The construction of these models and
using them to predict effects are challenging as well.
To represent a system as a model, abstraction is needed. An incorrect abstraction of a system to a
model renders the model potentially useless; there is no point predicting effects off of a model if the
model does not accurately reflect the system. An incorrect level of abstraction is also problematic.
Too much abstraction leaves models that are not capable of answering the required questions; too
little abstraction results in large models that cannot be analysed, constructed, or require too much
time or effort to construct.
A means is required to abstract models from a business process that are an accurate reflection
of the system; capable of answering questions posed to it, and yet be small enough to construct and
interpret easily. The interpretation of the model itself poses problems once abstraction is completed.
Simulation is used to anticipate model behaviour. Though capable of evaluating model behaviour,
simulation is bound by certain limitations. It relies on unknown or estimated data for its operation,
and simulation only provides feedback on general model behaviour. Simulation does not evaluate all
possible executions of the model, and can therefore not prove model properties or behaviours.
The evaluation of models without simulation is even less robust. It relies on intuition and testing
to find faults in the process. Testing can also not prove properties or evaluate all possible executions
of the system.
An approach is therefore needed that can abstract, construct and evaluate models easily. This
19
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method must be able to evaluate all possible executions, answer questions on model behaviour with
certainty, and be capable of formally proving model properties.
4.1 Research argument
Model checking is capable of addressing the needs as described above. It evaluates all possible model
behaviours and answers questions regarding behaviour. The aforementioned answers provided the
by model checking are the formally proven behaviour properties of the model.
In order to apply model checking, formal specifications of the process and behaviour properties
are required. So for business processes to be model checked requires them to be specified in a formal
language. Models must also be small enough to be verified.
A business process consists of a definable and finite set of rules that structure related tasks and
activities together to produce a specific service or product. These rules and their behaviour require-
ments can be specified in a formal language like PROMELA. Therefore, in general, business processes
can be verified in the same way as a communication’s protocol with model checking. BIZZDesigner
uses this this property to convert business processes into PROMELA code for verification with SPIN.
One objection to the formalisation of business processes is that the human component makes
it unsuitable for model checking[22]. Human behaviour is viewed as irrational or non-deterministic
and not verifiable using model checking. This objection is, however, not valid. Though a single com-
puter may be deterministic in its operation, the communication between a network of computers
is not. Model checking is used to develop procedures and protocols that operate reliably in non-
deterministic environments.
Model checking is used to address the unpredictability of distributed and networked computing.
It allows for the development of procedures that can reliably function in this non-deterministic1 en-
vironment. The unpredictability of humans in a system is not a problem for model checking, rather
it can help to reduce the effects that such behaviour has on the system.
Using model checking on humans and business resources can build predictable and reliable sys-
tems from unpredictable and unreliable components, in the same way that we have reliable and pre-
dictable communications over unreliable and unpredictable network infrastructure.
4.1.1 Model checking in an informal environment
The challenge in using model checking in business processes is not the unpredictability of the com-
ponents from which it is made, but rather its lack of formality. There are too many variables to con-
sider and the processes are not always concrete enough. The problem is the abstraction of the process
to a level where model checking can be applied to it.
1Network activity and timing issues result in the non-deterministic behaviour of network computing.
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There are two obstacles to the verification of business processes. Firstly the transformation of
both the formal and informal elements of a business process into a PROMELA model. Secondly this
model must be of verifiable complexity. A method is needed to process the “soft”, “fuzzy” or informal
elements of humans and organisations into models and requirements that can be model checked.
4.1.2 Formality distillation with the Logical Thinking Process
The formalised common sense of the Logical Thinking Process uses both the formal and informal
components to analyse the system. It takes the formal parts and scrutinises them with the intuition
and feelings of the people who are involved in the system. Though not a formal method in itself, it
uses the informal to abstract a model that describes the essence of the problem in the system.
Although the inputs and processes of the Logical Thinking Process are not formal, the outputs
are. They provide concrete verification requirements, as well as solutions that can be model checked.
The process also abstracts the solution from the system by only focusing on the trouble spots. This
reduces the complexity of the models, and makes them easier to construct and verify.
4.2 Solution outline
In the next chapter we will take the Logical Thinking Process and use it to construct abstract models
of the reality that is currently operating in the system. In doing so, the non-formal components are
removed and abstract solutions constructed that are formal enough to model check. We will then take
these solutions and transform them into models that are then model checked using standard model
checking methods.
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THE COMPLEXITY ALLEVIATION METHOD
I
N this chapter we introduce the Complexity Alleviation Method (CAM) we have developed to for-
malise business protocols from their informal environment and to present them in a form suit-
able for model checking. A graphical outline of the method is given in Figure 5.1.
CAM transforms business processes and their non-formal components with the Logical Thinking
Processes into system specifications and verification requirements. These specifications and require-
ments are then translated into PROMELA and verified using SPIN.
5.1 Methodology overview
A business process that is model checked is described by three different paradigms when CAM is used.
This is the normal, or reality paradigm description of the process, the TOC paradigm description,
and the model checking paradigm description. The TOC paradigm is used to identify the principal
constraint of the system and develop solutions that would address this constraint, as can be seen
in Figure 5.1. The model checking paradigm then takes theses solutions and verifies if they in fact
possess the properties that they are supposed to have, thus leaving a validated plan.
The transition between these paradigms is, to a large extent, a jargon transformation. In the fol-
lowing section we map the terminology used in the different paradigms and discuss how they relate
to each other.
5.1.1 Reality to TOC terminology transformation
When changing a system, two design considerations are present; concerns that need to be addressed
and objectives that need to be met. Modelling a solution should address both of these areas.
22
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Figure 5.1: Diagrammatic overview of CAM
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Concerns about the system are known in TOC as Undesirable Effects (UDEs) and are used to con-
struct the CRT as illustrated in Section 2.2.1. Objectives or ideas about how the system should behave
are called Desirable Effects. These are used in the construction of the FRT.
5.1.2 TOC to model checking terminology transformation
The CRT maps the process and determines the root cause of its problems or principal constraint.
This principal constraint is then translated into safety properties. We wish to eliminate the principal
constraint or root cause from our system, in other words, verify its non-existence in the system by
specifying it as a safety property. Likewise, the FRT determines the principal enablers, entities which
we desire to occur infinitely often; these enablers are translated into liveness properties. The Conflict
Cloud produces solutions that can be specified in PROMELA and are abstract enough to be verified by
SPIN.
This provides SPIN with all the components required for verification; formally specified correct-
ness properties, and an abstracted process model.
5.2 The application of the Logical Thinking Process
In this section we will describe how to transform business processes into inputs for SPIN using the
Logical Thinking Process. The process of transformation is depicted in Figure 5.2.
Objectives and concerns in the reality domain must be transformed into protocols and verifica-
tion requirements in order for proposed business processes to be model checked. This transforma-
tion is done in three parts: determining the principal constraint, developing solutions, and establish-
ing the principal enabler.
5.2.1 Formulating safety properties from the CRT
We will start by discussing how to determine the principal constraint from the concerns or UDEs
using the CRT, and how to translate this into safety properties. This section focuses on the TOC sub-
process as highlighted in Figure 5.3.
The aim of TOC is systems improvement, by identifying, exploiting, elevating and eventually elim-
inating the constraint as described in Section 2.1.2. A business process that is model checked must at
the very least address the principal constraint. In other words, any solution that is produced by our
approach must, under all circumstances, be free of the principal constraint. This is the exact defini-
tion of a safety property. So the principal constraint is verified as a safety property of the new business
process.
Assuming that a system is interrelated, we ascribe multiple concerns UDEs to a single cause. This
single cause to most problems is the principal constraint safety property. The process to determine
the principal constraint starts with identifying and formulating the UDEs.
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
CHAPTER 5. THE COMPLEXITY ALLEVIATION METHOD 25
R
e
a
lit
y
Ideas Concerns 
Desirable 
Effects
UDE's
Solutions
Principal 
Constraint & 
Enablers
T
O
C
M
o
d
e
l
C
h
e
c
k
in
g
Protocols
Verification
Requirements
Thinking
Process
SPIN
Physical 
System
Validated Plan
Desirable
EffectsUDEs
Current
Reality Tree
Principal 
Constraint
Safety 
Properties
Conflict
Cloud
Applicable 
Solutions 
Future Reality 
Tree
Principal  
Enablers
Liveness 
Properties
Potential 
Protocols
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Figure 5.3: The formulation of safety properties as part of the TOC sub-processes
At any point in time there are numerous UDEs in a system. These UDEs are subjective and depend
on the person that identifies them, and as discussed in Section 2.1.1, they are also context dependant.
UDEs that are used in the CRT have to meet additional criteria, over and above just being a concern.
Everyone must agree that it is a relevant UDE in the system. Only the three to five most important
and agreed upon UDEs are used to construct a CRT.
For demonstration, four generic UDEs A, B , C and D are shown in Figure 5.4. These UDEs form
the start of the CRT that will be built. They have also been coloured red for identification.
Wanting to understand the relationship between the four UDEs, we describe their cause or effect.
The relationships of the UDEs in Figure 5.4 are read as follows: E causes C , or C exists because of E .
If B exists then F happens. If D and G exist, then A will be present in the system.
We continue to expand the cause and effect relationships until all the UDEs are connected in a
single diagram as shown in Figure 5.5.
We want to find the principal constraint. We described the cause and effect relationships between
the UDEs until all of them were related. The constraint in the system is then the entity that is the root
cause of most, if not all of the UDEs. In Figure 5.5 the principal constraint is entity E .
E is the principal constraint since none of the UDEs will exist if E does not exist. We make this
statement due to the causal relationship we described between entity E and the UDEs. In the event
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
CHAPTER 5. THE COMPLEXITY ALLEVIATION METHOD 27
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
Figure 5.4: Cause and effect of UDEs A, B , C and D
that we remove E , C will no longer exist. Entity I exists because of UDEs A and C and is therefore
directly dependent on E as well. The UDE B has a similar dependence on E .
E is the common denominator for the existence of all UDEs in the system and is, as a result, the
principal constraint. If we remove E then none of the UDEs are caused based on our understanding
of the relationships that exits in the system. Removing E therefore solves all the UDEs in our system.
The non-existence of E is the safety property of the new process. This is because E has been
identified as the principal constraint and is the root cause of all of the UDEs in the system. If it can
be shown that E does not exist in the new business process then the new process will address all the
UDEs of our current system. A new process must at the very least address the principal constraint for
it to be effective.
It has been mentioned that a safety property is something that is never to be violated. Therefore
if a solution has been verified for a specific safety property it is assured that the undesired situation
will never occur.
So if E is the principal constraint in the system then it is necessary to demonstrate in the new
solution that E will never occur. This can be expressed in LTL as Always Not E , or equivalently
 ! E . (5.1)
Note that equation (5.1) is a valid LTL statement which can be used by a model checker to validate
that a model adheres to the above-mentioned requirements.
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5.2.2 Example
As a more concrete example, let us take a financial service provider that has determined that the
principal constraint in their current business process is that clients do not have 24-hour access to
their finances. We must then demonstrate using SPIN that clients always have access to their finances.
As an LTL safety property this is given by
 Access To F i nances. (5.2)
The preceding section demonstrated how to take the concerns that are present in the physical sys-
tem and transform them with the Logical Thinking Process into correctness properties. The principal
constraint derived from the CRT is the safety property required by SPIN to verify potential solutions.
To construct a model that has to describe the behaviour of a single principal constraint property
instead of multiple UDEs reduces model complexity. The implication of this is that elaborate solu-
tions describing numerous concerns are no longer required. The result is smaller models with less
variables that are easier to construct and verify.
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5.2.3 Solution selection and creation
Section 5.2.1 demonstrated how to determine the principal constraint and define safety properties.
In this section we discuss the construction of the Conflict Cloud from the principal constraint, and
how to develop solutions from it as introduced in Section 2.2.2 p. 8. Figure 5.6 depicts the progress of
CAM.
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Figure 5.6: Solution selection and creation process
In the previous section we identified that the current system has a principal constraint E . The new
system should have the safety property (5.1) but still retain all the functionality of the old system. This
poses a problem.
If we look back we see that E was not identified as a UDE, and by implication, is not an obvious
concern in the system. Otherwise it would have been selected as a UDE. So the existence of E has
some reason for its presence or performs some function other than causing the UDEs. So removing
E will have an impact other than the removal of UDEs from the system. This leads to a conflict. Keep
E and retain current system functionality, or remove E and the UDEs but lose system functionality.
This is where Conflict Cloud comes in. It is designed to help devise solutions that will retain all
the functionality of having E but with none of the UDE impact.
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The generic construction of the clouds used in CAM starts with the principal constraint identified
in the CRT. The principal constraint in the generic Conflict Cloud is represented by entity D . The ob-
jective is to construct a system that is free from the principal constraint and would imply the existence
of an entity that is the opposite, or inverse of the principal constraint, !D . This inverse principal con-
straint is represented by entity D ′ in the cloud shown in Figure 5.7. All principal constraints possess
an inverse; it would not be possible to construct a Conflict Cloud without them.
B
D'
D
C
A
Figure 5.7: Conflict Cloud of the principal constraint
The second step would be to find B and C , and they are determined by answering the following
questions:
• Why would the existence of D/D ′ be desirable?
• What would fail to happen should D/D ′ not exist?
• What would be achievable if D/D ′ is present?
Entity A represents the common objective of both B and C . Two perceived mutually exclusive
aims are competing against one another for the same objective, D , and D ′, this giving rise to the con-
flict, and as a result this common goal must be determined. The formulation of the common objective
lays the foundation for solution development by exposing the assumptions that are inhibiting system
performance.
The Conflict Cloud gives rise to a logical contradiction, since both D and D ′ strive to obtain the
same goal, yet D and D ′ are deemed mutually exclusive. Therefore one of the assumptions used to
construct the cloud must be flawed. The Conflict Cloud finds the assumption that causes the princi-
pal constraint in the same way the CRT finds the principal constraint from the UDEs. This incorrect
and inhibiting assumption is the key to the development of a solution that eliminates the principal
constraint from the system.
Let us explain the identification of this assumption by means of an example.
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We start with the principal constraint of the system. In Section 5.2.1 we stated the bank identified
their principal constraint as “clients do not have 24-hour access to their funds”. This is because clients
need to transact outside of normal office hours. We now label entity D in the Conflict Cloud “We
maintain normal business hours”. The inverse of the principal constraint D is placed in D ′, “Provide
24-hour service”.
So, why would the existence of the principal constraint D be desirable? The answer is that normal
operating hours keeps overheads in check. This is placed in B . Extending business hours would
create more transactions for the bank and therefore more turnover. So C is labelled “Generate more
transactions”.
To complete the Conflict Cloud a common objective between B and C is found. This would be the
long-term profitability of the bank. This common objective is placed in A and completes the Conflict
Cloud. The cloud is provided in Figure 5.8.
B
Keep Overheads In 
Check
D'
We Provide 24-Hour 
Service
D
We Maintain Normal 
Business Hours
C
Generate More 
Transactions
A
Be A Profitable Bank
Figure 5.8: Bank example of a Conflict Cloud
In order to solve the Conflict Cloud we need to identify the invalid assumption that gives rise to
the contradiction in the Conflict Cloud.
The example states that is necessary to provide clients 24/7 access to their finances in order to
improve turnover and profitability. At the same time it is not possible to extend business hours. Hiring
extra staff for the extended business hours will raise overheads considerably. There exists a conflict
as well as a contradiction in the Conflict Cloud. So, in order to increase profitability, it would appear
that profitability needs to be reduced.
What makes the Conflict Cloud so powerful is that it visibly presents the associated assumptions
of the conflict. These assumptions are located under the arrows and the lightning bolt. Therefore
a closer look is taken at each of these assumptions and from amongst the five. one should appear
suspect. In the case of the Conflict Cloud in Figure 5.8 the assumption that is first to merit a closer
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look would be the lightning bolt between D and D ′. The assumption that underpins the lightning
bolt would be that in order to provide 24-hour service to clients normal business hours need to be
increased, and this is not necessarily true.
The aim would be to find an instance where the aforementioned assumption would no longer
necessarily be true. Introducing an ATM into the bank’s business process would accomplish just that,
since the bank would not need to extend their normal business hours but would still be able to trans-
act with their clients 24/7.
Therefore it would appear that the solution to the principal constraint as described here would be
the introduction of an ATM in the bank’s business process. This conjecture forms the departure point
from which solutions are constructed.
Solutions are now developed around this conjecture. They focus on the incorporation of new
ideas into the current system. Some questions need to be answered: How will we accommodate an
ATM in the current business process model? What will change when an ATM system is introduced?
How will this change affect clients?
It is the incorporation of the conjecture into the current system that gives rise to solutions. The
conjecture is derived from the principal constraint, so the solutions are centred around it as well.
There may also be more than one way to incorporate the conjecture into the current system. Even
so, all these solutions have to address the same safety property, and flow from the same conjecture.
If only one safety property is addressed and verified by all solutions, instead of multiple solutions
addressing different properties, then solution models are small, abstract, quicker to construct and
comparable with each other.
The addition of the conjecture changes the underlying protocol on which an organisation op-
erates. It is these changes which we would like to model and verify. The development of the new
business protocol is done by working out how the process will change or look when the new conjec-
ture operates in the system. As has been said, there may be more than one way this can be done, and
all these should be developed and explored.
The protocol describes how the process will operate under the new incorporated conjecture. The
aim of the protocol is to eliminate the principal constraint, and we therefore specify the non-existence
of the principal constraint as a safety property. Had we not used the Logical Thinking Process, it is
not guaranteed that a common safety property would be shared by multiple solutions. This common
principal constraint is used to focus the model abstraction and enables multiple solutions to be com-
pared with each other. The informality of business processes that is mentioned in Section 4.1.1 does
not lend itself to this process without the help of the Logical Thinking Process.
Instead of modelling the entire operating system of the bank, addressing numerous variables, all
that the protocol must show is that the client will always have access to his finances. The solution for
the bank takes shape as follows.
Prior to the introduction of the ATM the customer process would have been described as in either
of one of three states. Idle, going to the bank or waiting for the bank. If a customer is in the idle
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position then the client is not in need of money. In the event that the need for money arises one of
two things can happen. The client can move to the state “going to the bank” in the event that the bank
is open, or “wait” until the bank opens up the next day. The introduction of an ATM into the system
then allows for another possibility should the customer desire money and the bank is closed. Now a
customer is no longer forced to enter into the “wait” state outside of business hours.
The FSM representation of these protocols can be seen in Section 5.3.1 in Figure 5.13.
5.2.4 The principal constraint as a common performance measurement unit and how
to distinguish between multiple solutions
At this stage of CAM we have generated protocols and verification requirements, and this is what is
needed for a verification run. If SPIN verifies that the safety property holds then it has been demon-
strated that the model will address the principal constraint and therefore bring benefit to the system.
If there is only one solution and it addresses the principal constraint the analysis can stop. In the
event that multiple solutions have been developed and are capable of addressing the same principal
constraint, it would be useful to distinguish between them based on some form of merit.
This is where having the same safety property between different solutions becomes useful. Were
this not the case it would be difficult to compare different solutions with each other. It is not possible
to objectively measure the suitability of solutions if they do not address the same problem. If solutions
were developed for the respective UDEs, then how would you compare the solutions to each other?
How do you weigh the importance of the different UDEs, and what does it mean if solutions are found
that do not address all of the UDEs? Reducing the multiple UDEs to a single root cause provides a
common unit of measurement and solves these problems.
Having established now that more than one solution can address the principal constraint, it would
be informative to know what additional benefits the different methods can provide. The following
section determines these benefits in the same way as the identification of the principal constraint.
5.2.5 Formulation of liveness properties
This section of the methodology is highlighted in Figure 5.9. The following section enables SPIN
to demonstrate the differences between multiple solutions that verifiably solves the principal con-
straint.
It has been stated that the aim is systems improvement, and that the greatest improvement is
gained when the principal constraint is eliminated. This is verified as a safety property in the previous
section and as a proven capability of any solutions at this point. Having brought benefit to the system
it is possible to further distinguish between solutions with the use of liveness properties.
Holzmann describes liveness and safety properties as follows. Safety, then, defines the bad things
that should be avoided, and liveness defines the good things that capture the required functionality
of the system.
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Figure 5.9: Expanded transitional diagram of the TOC sub-process generating liveness properties
Paraphrasing Holzmann in our context means the elimination of the identified UDEs (bad) as
safety properties and the description of additional good features about the system as liveness prop-
erties. These liveness properties are identified in the FRT.
The FRT is built on the same common sense as the CRT as described in Section 2.2.3, p.8. Where
the CRT starts with the UDEs the FRT takes the conjecture from the Conflict Cloud, and expands
it until it is linked with all the desirable effects to be seen in the system. Liveness properties are
desirable situations which should occur infinitely often in a system. If this is the case, then the TOC
equivalent of liveness priorities are desirable effects. Like the CRT, the FRT takes multiple causes and
conjectures1 and determines the relationships between them.
These relationships take the injections which solves the Conflict Cloud and expands them until
they reach the desired effects which are to be seen in the system. There are only a limited number of
these desirable effects, thus reducing the complexity model of the solution.
The desirable effect to model for is the effect which stems from the greatest number of assump-
tions. The process is similar to the determination of the principal constraint only the direction is
inverted. Where the safety properties were found at the bottom of the CRT, liveness properties are
found at the top of the FRT.
The beauty of using trees is that they intrinsically reduce complexity. Once again, complex and
interrelated realites as well as the multiple impacts of proposed solutions are reduced to a limited
number of focus points.
1Also known in TOC as injections.
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Liveness properties are formulated in LTL in the same way as safety properties in Section 5.2.1.
5.3 Model checking domain
This section discusses the model checking and final section of CAM depicted in Figure 5.10. It shows
how the verification of a solution generated by the Logical Thinking Process is done.
5.3.1 Input transformation
The solutions and verification properties generated in Section 5.1.2 are transformed to make them
suitable for SPIN and verification. This process is shown in Figure 5.11.
We have already formulated the safety and liveness properties with LTL in the previous section.
Safety properties are the negation of the principal constraint and liveness properties the desired ef-
fects. This holds true for the majority of the cases. It may, however, be necessary in some cases to
verify properties other than the simple negation of the principal constraint. This is left to the discre-
tion of the modeller.
SPIN does not accept LTL formulae in their raw form. It is necessary to reformulate the formulae
in PROMELA code. This conversion is done by a separate module in SPIN and all that is required is a
valid LTL statement. The conversion of the “Always Not Wait” safety property identified as the bank’s
principal constraint is done by the SPIN command: spin -f ‘[]!Wait’. The output of this command is
listed below.
$ spin -f ’[]!Wait’
never { /* []!Wait */
accept_init:
T0_init:
if
:: (! ((Wait))) -> goto T0_init
fi;
}
Listing 5.1: A never claim inPROMELA code as generated by SPIN
The never claim generated by SPIN is then inserted into the PROMELA model and is used to verify
the behaviour properties.
Having converted the correctness properties into PROMELA code we now move on to the conver-
sion of the solutions. The intermediate step to writing the solution in PROMELA is to draw it as an FSM.
This is similar to writing the principal enablers and constraints as LTL statements before generating
PROMELA code for it.
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Figure 5.10: Diagrammatic method representation of the model checking domain
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Figure 5.11: The homogenisation process within the model checking domain
The reason for this conversion into an FSM is twofold. Firstly it is easier to visualise the solution
as an FSM. Secondly it is a simple conversion to write PROMELA code from an FSM. It is possible to
write the PROMELA model directly from the solution, but the construction of the FSM as an interme-
diate step helps in the transformation of the solution from TOC to the model checking paradigm. To
demonstrate this conversion let us take the ATM example given in Section 5.2.3 as an FSM.
The initial business process of the bank without an ATM consists of 3 states: Idle, Wait and
Bank. Idle is the state that the customer remains in until he needs money. In the event that a need
arises and the bank is available to meet that need, the state of the customer changes to Bank. After
the customer has been serviced he returns to the Idle state. A customer enters the Wait state in
the event that the need for bank services occurs outside of normal business hours. The FSM of this
process is given in Figure 5.12.
The introduction of the ATM into the system changes the FSM by adding an additional state where
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a customer can be served by an ATM over and above the services provided by the bank itself. As with
the Bank state, once the client’s needs have been serviced by the ATM he returns to the Idle state.
TheWait state is still defined as the interim state when neither the bank nor the ATM can be accessed
and the customer has the need to access his or her funds. The FSM of this figure can be seen in Figure
5.13.
Once the proposed protocol has been converted into an FSM (as described above) the construc-
tion of the PROMELA model can begin.
Idle
Bank
Need
&
Available
Wait
Need
&
 Not Available
Available
Figure 5.12: An FSM of the original process
5.3.2 PROMELA model construction and verification using SPIN
The next step in CAM, as shown in Figure 5.14, is the generation of the PROMELA model. The conver-
sion from LTL to PROMELA was already shown in Listing 5.1. We will now describe how the translation
form FSM to PROMELA is done.
We continue with the ATM example and construct a model of the FSM depicted in Figure 5.13. The
model is written in pseudo code for the sake of clarity. The reader is referred to [14] for an exhaustive
description on how a full PROMELA model is constructed.
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 ATM Available
Wait
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 Available  Available 
Figure 5.13: An FSM of the proposed business process that includes the introduction of an ATM
The construction of a PROMELA model from an FSM is done by the conversion of three of the
elements in the FSM into their equivalent counterparts in PROMELA code. These elements and their
PROMELA equivalents are listed below.
• Transitions between states are transitions (->) with guards in PROMELA.
• States in the FSM are rewritten as labels in PROMELA.
• The transition requirements are the guard statements before the Go-To’s.
Labels Each state of the FSM in Figure 5.13 represents a label in the control structure of the PROMELA
code. In the case of the ATM bank FSM instance there will be four separate labels:
• Idle
• ATM
• Bank
• Wait
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
CHAPTER 5. THE COMPLEXITY ALLEVIATION METHOD 40
Liveness 
Properties
Safety 
PropertiesProtocols
FSM LTL LTL
PROMELA
Model
SPIN
Verification 
Success
Verification
Failure
Evaluate 
Trail File
Adapt Protocol
Validated Model 
Solution
Figure 5.14: Model construction and verification process within the model checking domain
Guards The transitions that occur between the states depend on certain conditions prior to their
execution. The client can only move from Idle to Bank if there is both a need and the bank is
available; the same applies to the transition from Idle to ATM. Moving from Idle to Wait implies
a need but no availability from either bank or ATM. The customer waits until either bank or ATM
becomes available.
PROMELA Pseudo Code When all of these separate elements are combined it forms the PROMELA
model in Listing 5.2. A working PROMELA model of both FSMs in Figures 5.12 and 5.13 is provided in
Appendix A.
never { /* []!Wait */
accept_init:
T0_init:
if
:: (! (Wait)) -> goto T0_init
fi;
}
Idle:
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if
::(Need && Bank Available) -> goto Bank
::(Need && ATM Available) -> goto ATM
::(Need) -> goto Wait
fi;
Bank:
do
:: goto Idle
od;
ATM:
do
:: goto Idle
od;
Wait:
if
:: (Bank Available) -> goto Bank
:: (ATM Available) -> goto ATM
fi;
Listing 5.2: PROMELA code of FSM in Figure 5.13
Verification By Using SPIN Once both the verification requirements as well as the model have been
constructed the completed model is handed to SPIN for verification. The aim of the verification is
simply to receive a “yes” or a “no” answer to the adherence of the solution to the behaviour specifi-
cations. In the event that SPIN returns a “yes” then the verification is complete. If “no” is returned
we are interested in how the model failed, so that we can reevaluate the solution. Of all the output
generated by SPIN only the “yes” “no” answer is important.
A verification for both bank models will be done, demonstrating the differences between the suc-
cessful verification of a model and a verification failure. Let us then verify the FSM of the bank process
with an ATM in Figure 5.13 with SPIN to ensure that the customer will never be placed in the “wait”
state again. Listing 5.3 is the output of a SPIN for this verification run.
1 (Spin Version 5.2.2 -- 7 September 2009)
2 + Partial Order Reduction
3
4 Full statespace search for:
5 never claim +
6 assertion violations + (if within scope of claim)
7 acceptance cycles - (not selected)
8 invalid end states - (disabled by never claim)
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9
10 State-vector 28 byte, depth reached 27, errors: 0
11 17 states, stored
12 50 states, matched
13 67 transitions (= stored+matched)
14 0 atomic steps
15 hash conflicts: 0 (resolved)
16
17 4.653 memory usage (Mbyte)
18
19 unreached in proctype BankATM
20 line 42, state 17, "p = 1"
21 line 55, state 35, "-end-"
22 (2 of 35 states)
23
24 pan: elapsed time 0 seconds
Listing 5.3: SPIN output for the verification of the ATM bank process
The “yes” or “no” answer to the verification run is located on line 10 of Listing 5.3. The error value
of 0 denotes a “yes” and means that the business process for the bank with an ATM does not place a
customer in the wait condition under any circumstances, and implies a successful verification.
5.3.3 Verification results
The outcome of the verification determines which section of highlighted CAM is executed in Figure
5.15.
Verification Success A verification is considered a success in the event that SPIN returns an error
value of 0, as does the example given in Listing 5.3. This means that there is no instance that where
the solution fails to meet the verification requirements. This means that, by implication, the solution
provably meets its behaviour objectives under all circumstances and can be implemented with con-
fidence. The successful verification of the ATM bank model in Listing 5.3 implies that the bank can
implement the solution with confidence and that CAM can terminate.
Verification Failure The FSM of the original bank processes in Figure 5.12 is expected to fail a veri-
fication with the same correctness properties. We subject the model to the same verification require-
ments as we did for the ATM model and analyse the output. The SPIN output for this verification is
given in Listing 5.4.
1 pan: claim violated! (at depth 25)
2 pan: wrote NoATMModel.trail
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Figure 5.15: The verification results process within the model checking domain
3
4 (Spin Version 5.2.2 -- 7 September 2009)
5 Warning: Search not completed
6 + Partial Order Reduction
7
8 Full statespace search for:
9 never claim +
10 assertion violations + (if within scope of claim)
11 acceptance cycles - (not selected)
12 invalid end states - (disabled by never claim)
13
14 State-vector 28 byte, depth reached 25, errors: 1
15 15 states, stored
16 8 states, matched
17 23 transitions (= stored+matched)
18 0 atomic steps
19 hash conflicts: 0 (resolved)
20
21 4.653 memory usage (Mbyte)
22
23
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24 pan: elapsed time 0 seconds
Listing 5.4: SPIN output of the bank process without an ATM
In line 14 an error value of 1 has been returned. This means that, as expected, the model failed
to meet the verification requirements. Line 2 refers to a .trail file that was written by SPIN. This file
contains the information needed by SPIN to reproduce the failure run that shows how the model
failed to meet the verification requirements. The simulated trail file for the failed verification of the
bank business process is given in Listing 5.5.
1 Thomas:jock$ spin -t -p ATMModel
2 Starting BankATM with pid 0
3 Starting :never: with pid 1
4 Never claim moves to line 17 [else]
5 2: proc 0 (BankATM) line 28 "ATMModel" (state 1) [p = 0]
6 4: proc 0 (BankATM) line 49 "ATMModel" (state 28) [Need = 1]
7 6: proc 0 (BankATM) line 33 "ATMModel" (state 2)
8 [((State==1))]
9 8: proc 0 (BankATM) line 35 "ATMModel" (state 3)
10 [((Need&&BankAvailable))]
11 8: proc 0 (BankATM) line 35 "ATMModel" (state 4) [State = 2]
12 10: proc 0 (BankATM) line 50 "ATMModel" (state 29) [Need = 0]
13 12: proc 0 (BankATM) line 52 "ATMModel" (state 31)
14 [BankAvailable = 0]
15 14: proc 0 (BankATM) line 40 "ATMModel" (state 12)
16 [((State==2))]
17 14: proc 0 (BankATM) line 40 "ATMModel" (state 13) [State = 1]
18 16: proc 0 (BankATM) line 49 "ATMModel" (state 28) [Need = 1]
19 18: proc 0 (BankATM) line 33 "ATMModel" (state 2)
20 [((State==1))]
21 20: proc 0 (BankATM) line 37 "ATMModel" (state 7)
22 [(((Need&&!(BankAvailable)))]
23 20: proc 0 (BankATM) line 37 "ATMModel" (state 8) [State = 4]
24 22: proc 0 (BankATM) line 42 "ATMModel" (state 16)
25 [((State==4))]
26 24: proc 0 (BankATM) line 42 "ATMModel" (state 17) [p = 1]
27 Never claim moves to line 16 [(p)]
28 spin: trail ends after 25 steps
29 #processes: 1
30 p = 1
31 25: proc 0 (BankATM) line 55 "ATMModel" (state 35)
32 <valid end state>
33 25: proc - (:never:) line 19 "ATMModel" (state 7)
34 <valid end state>
35 1 processes created
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Listing 5.5: A SPIN simulation of the bank business process .trail file
Listing 5.5 is interpreted in conjunction with the PROMELA model in Listing A.2. The process is
initialised with the bank being available and the customer not in a state of waiting. Line 6 shows that
a customer registers a need to transact with the bank. Line 8 shows that the need arises during the
idle state and Line 10 states that the bank is available to meet the need. The need disappears (line 12)
while the customer is being serviced (line 16), but so does the bank availability (line 14). This can be
interpreted as a client being helped in the bank while it closes. The need for service arises again (line
16) while the client is leaving (line 17 and 20) but the bank is now closed (line 14 and 22). This forces
the client into the waiting state (line 23 and 25) that triggers the failure of the never claim (line 26 and
27).
This is a valid scenario of how the bank process without an ATM would require a customer to wait
for it to open before it can transact. SPIN is capable, as shown above, of describing such failure in great
and sequential detail. The combination is a step-by-step guide on how a solution failed. Though the
example given here can be solved by inspection, it demonstrates the detail and the accuracy of the
feedback provided by SPIN when model failures happen. This feedback can then be used in fixing the
solution or to establish if a different approach is needed altogether. Once a replacement solution is
developed it is again given to SPIN for verification.
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CAM EXAMPLE
W
ITH CAM developed in the preceding chapter let us demonstrate its operation by means
of an example. CAM is applied to the bullwhip effect, a common supply chain problem,
to explain how to apply it to a practical problem; the solution process works to abstract
protocols from solutions, and implement and verify a model. It also demonstrates how a large and
involved system can be represented by a small, abstracted, and verifiable model.
6.1 The bullwhip effect
The bullwhip effect is the term used to describe the phenomenon when only minor changes in de-
mand for a product result in major fluctuations further up in the supply chain. This phenomenon
has been documented as far back as 1961 [23] but its impact and effect are still prevalent in numer-
ous supply chains today.
The phenomenon is well-studied and documented [24; 25; 26] with numerous case studies and
reports on the phenomenon. The quintessential example of the bullwhip effect is the case where
Procter & Gamble [27] noticed a massive fluctuation in the manufacturing demand for their Pampers
diapers. This fluctuation was odd since the consumer demand for diapers remains stable. The fluc-
tuations due to the amplification of normal variation in demand to abnormal levels further up the
supply chain. This is the result of the policies, practises and procedures as well as physical and op-
erational conditions that exist in the supply chain. The result of these factors is that the further away
from the consumer you move in the supply chain the greater the amplification effect becomes.
The bullwhip effect compels manufacturing to invest in excess sprint capacity to fulfil orders. Ca-
pacity that is not only expensive, but also unnecessary, since there is no real fluctuation in demand.
46
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One response is to push up inventory levels to deal with the fluctuations, which implies additional
holding and obsolescence costs. Despite all the investment in inventory and excess capacity a supply
chain subject to the bullwhip effect will also suffer frequent stock outs. Since there is no actual fluc-
tuation in demand these additional expenses only add costs to the product without bringing any real
benefit to the customer.
In this chapter we model business processes that are prone to suffer from the bullwhip effect.
This shows how CAM models business processes and hoe it is used to analyse and improve systems. It
also demonstrates how CAM is used to develop solutions and business processes that combat current
operational problems, in this case the bullwhip effect.
6.2 TOC subsection of CAM
The first step in CAM is to identify concerns in the system. These concerns are the drivers for the
construction of the CRT. The Logical Thinking Process requires the identification of 3 to 5 main con-
cerns or UDEs for the construction of the CRT. In this analysis the UDEs identified in a supply chain
suffering from bullwhip are that:
• resources are not used efficiently,
• there is not enough capacity to fulfil orders in time,
• there is too much inventory of unneeded stock keeping units (SKUs),
• and there are stock outs of needed SKUs.
We combine these UDEs into a CRT in order to find the constraint that is the common cause to them
all. The CRT for the supply chain suffering from bullwhip is given in Figure 6.1.
From the CRT we can see that the root cause of all the UDEs stems from the fact that orders placed
in the system are for both anticipated and actual demand. This is the reason for the amplification
further up the supply chain. The amplification is due, in part, to the negative feedback loop, shown in
Figure 6.1, created by the stock outs. This feedback loop reinforces the client’s behaviour to anticipate
stock outs and order quantities other than the actual demand. This further degrades the ability of
forecasting methods to predict sales, which in turn leads to incorrect production and more stock
outs before the whole process reinforces itself. The incorrect production schedule for the inaccurate
forecast is the cause for the other UDEs.
Now that we understand why orders are placed in this way the question remains as to how this
behaviour can be eliminated from the system in the future. The elimination of the principal con-
straint/behaviour will solve the current UDEs and bring benefit to the system, as we stated in the
development of CAM. The way to eliminate this root cause from the system is to resolve the conflict
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Figure 6.1: The CRT of the bullwhip supply chain
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Figure 6.2: The Conflict Cloud depicting the cause of the bullwhip effect
which gives rise to its existence. This, as mentioned, is done by the construction of a Conflict Cloud.
The Conflict Could for the bullwhip effect is provided in Figure 6.2.
The Conflict Cloud explains the problem faced by the supply chain as follows. The aim of the
system is to maximise the return on investment (ROI) for each of the independent parts of the supply
chain. To do this it is necessary that we maximise sales whilst not carring unnecessary stock. If we
want to maximise sales we must ensure that no stock outs occur and therefore we order for actual
sales as well as for anticipated demand. At the same time, if we carry unnecessary stock we incur
carrying, holding, and obsolescence costs. These costs must be minimised to maximise ROI. This
implies that we order only what is sold. This leads to a compromise between two conflicting actions
that are intended to achieve the same objective.
To solve this conflict the assumptions that lead to it must be identified. The assumption that
the use of a forecast to maximise sales is suspect. Forecasted sales information is inaccurate. Its re-
liance on historical data, and numerous assumptions based on client needs and preferences provides
various degrees of error. The forecast is used to protect the supply chain against stock outs, yet the
information we use to protect the system is inaccurate. If the forecast is based on historical data, this
data may not be for sales only but for safety stock also, further degrading forecasting accuracy. The
question is how do we maximise sales by not losing any to stock outs without the use of forecasted
information. The aim is to replace forecasting with a more effective means of combating stock outs.
If we shorten the time it takes between the placement of an order and the actual delivery thereof,
i.e. “lead times”, the risk of stock outs are reduced. If stock outs are addressed there is no need for cus-
tomers to anticipate demand. If so, then clients only need to place orders that reflects actual demand.
If we only need to respond to actual demand, which varies only slightly overall, instead of perceived
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demand (which varies drastically) this reduces variability in the system. Less variability enables the
system to respond even quicker to changes, thus eliminating the root causes of the bullwhip effect.
With the reduction in lead times it is possible to implement new order procedures in the supply
chain. These procedures are to order only what is sold.
6.3 Model checking section of the CAM example
In the previous section we identified the principal constraint that is the cause of the bullwhip effect,
i.e. orders are placed for both actual and forecasted demand. We must verify the safety property that
orders are always equal to actual demand. This can be expressed in terms of LTL as
 (Orders ↔ Demand). (6.1)
All proposed solutions to the bullwhip problem must satisfy this safety property.
The next step is to specify the proposed solutions as FSMs before they are transformed into PRO-
MELA code for verification. Solutions should only order stock to replenish that which has been sold.
The proposed implementation of this can be done in two different ways. The first option would be to
have a set schedule or rules that would order stock from the supplier at defined intervals. A system
functioning on this procedure would run on the FSM depicted in Figure 6.3. We denote this proposed
procedure as Sa .
The alternative to Sa is to place an order after every single transaction. A solution that uses this
approach would have an FSM that is depicted in Figure 6.4. Let us call this Sb . By placing an order
after every order it receives itself, Sb feeds live consumption information to suppliers, and the feed
creates transparency throughout the supply chain.
To verify these solutions against the principal constraint they are converted into PROMELA code
and handed to SPIN. The code used for the verification runs in Section 6.4 are provided in Appendix
B and C, respectively. The result of the verification of Sa and Sb against the principal constraint was
successful. These results show that both solutions will provably address the principal constraint and
bring benefit to the system and can therefore be implemented.
6.4 Determination of liveness properties
In the event that the Logical Thinking Process creates two separate solutions that both address the
principal constraint, CAM is also used to distinguish between the solutions. As stated in Section 5.2.5,
the way to accomplish this is with the use of liveness properties. These properties are derived from
the FRT in the same way that safety properties are drawn from the CRT and its principal constraints.
Liveness properties are the Desired Effects found in FRTs.
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Figure 6.4: Proposed procedure Sb
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Figure 6.5: The FRT of the supply chain after the implementation of solutions
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Table 6.1: Verification results
Solution Safety Property Verification Liveness Property Verification
 (Orders ↔ Demand)  [max (PD)≤max (k×CD)] , k = 1
A X #
B X X
The FRT of the solution is given in Figure 6.5. In the FRT we see that one of the predicted desir-
able effects is that the bullwhip effect will disappear from the system. This implies that demand on
production will level out. The demand will not be considerably more than the actual maximum of
product consumed per time period. One of the trademark characteristics of a supply chain suffering
from bullwhip is that demand on the factory is not correlated to actual consumption demand. So, in
addressing the principal constraint we will not only eliminate the identified UDEs in Figure 6.1 but
also resolve the bullwhip effect. We therefore define the measure of the bullwhip effect in the system
as a relative measure of the maximum demand from clients versus the maximum demand placed on
production.
At this stage we know that we have shown that we do not order more than is actually consumed
by clients. What we want to verify is that the demand placed on the factory is in line with the demand
of customers. So the liveness property that we verify for is that the maximum demand at the factory
is always less than the maximum client demand multiplied by a factor k. This is expressed in LTL as
 [max (PD)≤max (k×CD)], (6.2)
with k ≥ 1, PD = Pr oducti on Demand , and C D = C l i ent Demand . The value of k expresses the
degree of fluctuation allowed between these maximums. If verified with k = 1 the maximum demand
at the factory will never be more than the maximum consumed by customers.
If verified against this liveness property in Equation 6.2 described above, Sa fails and B passes. A
summary of the verification results is given in Table 6.1. The results are for a value of k = 1, and a
check mark (X) denotes verification success.
The verification from these solutions provides the following insights. Firstly we are capable of ad-
dressing the principal constraint of the problem that is faced. We are also not only able to address this
principal constraint but do so verifiably. This means that both of these solutions are in a position to
bring benefit to the system. With the safety properties verified, we are now able to measure Sa against
Sb in terms of their verification on the liveness property expressed in Equation 6.2. The performance
of the solutions in terms of their ability to curtail the bullwhip effect do, however, differ. With the
strict measure of k = 1 only Sb verifies. With less stringent requirements on k, Sa verifies as well.
Further verification demonstrates that there exists a direct correlation between the chosen value
of k, the lead time l in the system and the ability of a solution to pass verification. During the previ-
ous verification runs the value of l was kept constant; if it is altered, the outcome of the verification
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Table 6.2: Verification results matrix for Equation (6.2) with l and k as variables.
Verification for:  [max (PD)≤max (k×CD)]
Solution
Value
of k l 2l 3l
A
1 # # #
2 X # #
3 X X #
4 X X X
B
1 X X X
2 X X X
3 X X X
4 X X X
is affected, and shows the correlation between the magnitude1 of the bullwhip and lead time. The
results are provided in Table 6.2.
6.5 Verification implications and conclusions
The Logical Thinking Process analysis of the problem identified the principal constraint that orders
consist of both sold stock as well as forecasted demand. Both proposed solutions rectify this problem
provably. The use of CAM enabled an entire supply chain to be abstracted to a level that it can be
model checked. The reduction in complexity did not impede the ability of the model to provide valu-
able feedback, and decisions can be made on solution behaviour and suitability despite their abstract
nature.
The failure of the Sa to verify for the given liveness property established the correlation between
lead times and the bullwhip effect. It also shows that if complete transparency is obtained, as with Sb ,
then the bullwhip effect can be negated, even with long lead times. It also showed that if lead times
are shortened then the bullwhip effect is also reduced for the value of k = 1. It is therefore possible
to customise a solution so that increased costs of greater transparency and lead time reduction can
be balanced to maximise the ROI of the system. These results echo the findings in the literature
[24; 25; 26; 27] that reduction in lead times and the increase in supply chain transparency reduces the
bullwhip effect. This was demonstrated by CAM and done with generic and lower complexity models
when compared to simulation models presented in the literature.
1Of which k is the indicator; a larger k implies a larger variation.
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JIT VERSUS S-DBR COMPARISON
T
HE idea behind the of use CAM is to gain insight into the core problem faced by a system, to
apply this insight to find a solution, and then finally verify if the proposed solution does in
fact address the core problem. Folklore states that there are many ways to skin a cat, and in
this sense all solutions can be considered equal, yet in practise some solutions are more equal than
others1, and the aim is to find the better solution out of a group of apparently equal options.
In this chapter we apply CAM to a common problem scenario faced by the manufacturing en-
vironment. In the process it will determine the principal constraint and formulate solutions to the
problem, as was done in the previous chapters. The solutions verified in this chapter, JIT and S-DBR,
are some of the main improvement and management techniques used in manufacturing today [28].
The aim is to determine which of these accepted and widely implemented solutions are best suited
to address the problems faced by the hypothetical shop floor that is described in this chapter.
7.1 Production floor conditions
The first step in CAM is to identify the current UDEs in the system. The main concerns that are evident
on the shop floor are as follows:
1. Too much overtime.
2. Frequent expediting of orders.
3. Large amounts of Work In Process (WIP).
1Unlike the pigs in George Orwell’s, Animal Farm.
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4. Missed shipments.
Once again the CRTs are marked in red and the completed CRT is given in Figure 7.1. From the CRT it
is clear that there are two principal constraints. The first is the fact that the processes are interdepen-
dent, and the second that there is variability in the system. It is from these two principal constraints
that the observed UDEs originate. To address these UDEs one of these principal constraints must be
resolved. At this point in time the choice as to which of these two issues to address is left up to the
modeller, since resolving either will bring benefit to the system, as explained in Chapter 2.
WIP is not 
uniformly 
distributed 
throughout 
the system
Variability in the 
system
We produce 
less than we are 
capable of
Orders are not 
produced on 
time
Missed 
shipments
Some processes are 
starved of work and 
others have too much 
to do 
WIP is 
dependant on 
lead times
More time is 
needed to 
produce our 
products
We increase our 
lead time in order 
to finish our 
products on time
Large WIP
Frequent 
expediting of 
ordersToo much 
overtime
We plan 
according to 
what we can 
produce Processes are 
interdependent
Figure 7.1: CRT of production prior to implementing of a solution
In this evaluation the principal constraint that will be focused on is the variability in the system.
If the variation can be eliminated from the system then all the UDEs can be solved. So the criteria
that any solution should meet is the reduction of variability in the system.
The issue with the removal of variability in the system is that it is needed in some cases. For ex-
ample, if a client wishes to change an order or propose some sort of alteration, accommodating their
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request requires variability in the process. To better depict the conflict, the problem is formulated in
a Conflict Cloud provided in Figure 7.2.
Leave capacity to 
handle the unknown
There is NO variability 
in the system
There is variability in 
the system
System strictly 
adheres to the 
production schedule
Meet customer 
demands
Figure 7.2: Conflict Cloud representing variability as principal constraint
The Conflict Cloud states that the main objective of the system is to meet customer demand. In
order to meet this demand capacity is needed to handle the unknown, which in turn implies variabil-
ity in the system. On the other hand, if there is no variability in the system then schedules can strictly
be adhered to, and in doing so customer demand is met.
What injection would break the conflict in the system? The case has been made that not all vari-
ability is bad, though most variability usually is. One has to ask oneself, does a customer really care
how often the product was late during assembly or construction, if it is delivered on time? So a solu-
tion to the problem must address, or preferably eliminate the variation in deliveries to customers.
7.2 Potential solutions
There exist improvement methods and frameworks that address the problem of variability on the
shop floor. We will evaluate two such solutions with CAM in the following pages. Firstly the Just In
Time (JIT) method which forms part of the Toyota Production System [29, p.405], and secondly the
Simplified Drum Buffer Rope (S-DBR).
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7.2.1 JIT
JIT addresses variability in a system by decoupling dependant processes from each other by means of
the Kanban system [30]. A Kanban is a measure of work that for a specific station, be it a sub-assembly
or a number of parts that are grouped as a unit of work. A station is responsible for keeping the buffer
of Kanbans full for its immediate downstream process. The protocol that a workstation of a shop floor
running a JIT implementation should progress as follows.
1. If there is an open Kanban downstream, start production to fill it.
2. Continue producing until there is no more open downstream Kanbans.
3. If there are no open Kanbans do nothing.
This protocol is represented in FSM form in Figure 7.3.
Idle
Production
Produce  
material and 
send 
downstream 
Wait
Kanbans fullOpen Kanbans
Raw materials present
No raw material present
Raw materials present
Figure 7.3: The FSM representation of the JIT shop floor protocol
JIT addresses the issue variability by decoupling the interdependent processes with the Kanban
system. This places protective buffering that reduces the variability experienced by each of the indi-
vidual processes.
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7.2.2 S-DBR
The S-DBR solution does not address the variability of the process as a whole but rather focuses on
the final shipping variability. Everything in the system is done so that no orders are shipped late. The
solution consists of the following protocol [31, p. 149]:
1. If there is no work, do not go and look for work.
2. If work arrives start with it immediately.
3. If busy and work arrives with an earlier delivery date, then start with the job with the earliest
delivery date.
4. If there is more than one job in the queue then start on the job of greatest importance first.
The protocol is transformed into an FSM and is given in Figure 7.4.
7.3 Safety property formulation and solution verification
From the CRT we conclude that the variability in the system has to be addressed. Both JIT and S-
DBR appears to be in a position to accomplish this. From the Conflict Cloud we draw the conclusion
that not all variability needs to be addressed in order for the system to achieve its objective of meeting
client demand. Any implemented solutions must address variability of on time delivery to customers,
and preferably eliminate it. We define this safety property in LTL as
Deliver To Client On Time. (7.1)
JIT and S-DBR were subjected to verification under the safety property in Equation 7.1. The re-
sults were that JIT failed and S-DBR passed. A summary of the verification results are provided in
Table 7.1.
The verification results are interpreted as follows. Even though JIT potentially possessed the
means to address variability in the system, it is not capable of doing so consistently in the area where
it is needed most, on time delivery to clients. S-DBR, in contrast, is verifiably capable of meeting this
need. Therefore, given the set of UDEs which we originally wanted to eliminate from the system the
solution best suited to accomplish this would be S-DBR.
In environments where lead times are cut to the extent that even minor fluctuations would result
in an order being late the verification results do change. JIT still fails but so does S-DBR. The inter-
esting thing is that even though the solutions fail to verify against the safety property in Equation 7.1,
S-DBR does verify for
♦Deliver To Client On Time. (7.2)
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Idle
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 Job Arrive  Job Done
Evaluate
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 New Arrival Of 
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 New Item 
 Must Wait
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Start Job 
 In Q
Job Done
Figure 7.4: The FSM of the S-DBR protocol
Equation 7.2 is the logical extension of 7.1 based on our aim to reduce variability in on time delivery to
clients. If we are not in a position to eliminate all variability in on time delivery of products to clients
as described by the verification requirement in 7.1, then the second most restrictive LTL formula to
describe the property will then be 7.2.
7.4 Results discussion
The system in question faced numerous problems. These problems were all relayed back to a com-
mon root cause. In this case it was the fact that variability exists in a system. In order to solve these
problems this variability has to be addressed. Two potential solutions were put forward, JIT and S-
DBR, both holding the potential to reduce this variability.
The implementation of both of these solutions, respectively, have produced impressive results in
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Table 7.1: JIT and S-DBR verification results
Safety Property JIT S-DBR
Deliver To Client On Time # X
♦Deliver To Client On Time X X
With aggressive scheduling
Deliver To Client On Time # #
♦Deliver To Client On Time X X
Minimised inventory
Deliver To Client On Time # X
♦Deliver To Client On Time X X
With aggressive scheduling and minimised inventory
Deliver To Client On Time # #
♦Deliver To Client On Time X X
practise, and are therefore capable of doing so. The aim of CAM is not to form an implementation
methodology, but rather to match solutions to problems. This example once again demonstrated
this. For the problems described in this scenario S-DBR will be more suited to address the needs in
the system.
7.4.1 S-DBR recovery properties
S-DBR provably meets the critical objectives under a greater number and stricter operational require-
ments and JIT does not. We therefore, based on the verification of the solution ability to address the
principal constraint, recommend that S-DBR be implemented over JIT.
S-DBR provably addresses the principal constraint under normal circumstances, as well as ex-
treme conditions. The verification of S-DBR for Equation 7.2 provides additional insight into the
behaviour of the model under extreme conditions. S-DBR is proved by Equation 7.2 to be capable
of healing itself in all of the operational environments verified for in Table 7.1. In the event that the
system starts to fall behind on orders, S-DBR will, by its very nature, bring the system on time without
any additional external input.
This property has not been studied or documented in literature. This can possibly be attributed
to the novelty of using model checking to verify business properties. Using verification instead of
simulation in the analysis of protocols provides a different perspective and as a result insightful and
otherwise overlooked provable properties.
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7.4.2 The Lean paradox
The verification of JIT also brought insight not available with other techniques. From the verifica-
tion runs it is evident that there exists a paradox in JIT, and more specifically the Lean2 approach to
manufacturing. Lean strives to eliminate all waste [32, p.205] from the system. One of the main cate-
gories of waste is inventory. From the verification results it is evident that this results in the failure of
the manufacturing process to run smoothly under all conceivable circumstances. Though capable of
recovering itself (like S-DBR) from backlog, it is still not capable of producing consistently on time.
The models constructed for model checking are highly abstract. The implementation of JIT in
PROMELA describes the logical flow of the protocol. It is the simplest implementation model possible
of the process; it is independent of the underlying process times and variability. This pure conceptual
model analyses the logic of the protocol, and it is found to be self-contradictory. Only inventory
should be kept that is needed to satisfy consumer demand, according to the elimination of waste
philosophy. Seeing that the simplest form of demand then would be the existence of a single customer
with only demand for a single product, inventory should be kept to meet client demands, and in
this case inventory should be kept for a single customer. Under these conditions the process does
not meet the always on time delivery objective. Increasing inventory to triple the required amount
still does not provide the desired performance, whilst S-DBR provides this performance even at low
inventory levels.
There are numerous Lean implementation success stories: this contradiction does not invalidate
this. What it does point out is that there are mismatched assumptions in the approach. From the
verification results it is deduced that the performance of the protocol is independent from the level
of inventory. So regardless of the amount of surplus capacity, stock as well as constant demand, the
process will always move out of bounds, but will always return back to normal. This has undoubtedly
been compensated for in implementation but does not mean that the anomaly should be ignored. We
use both quantum mechanics and the theory of relativity (though mutually exclusive) contradictory
to great effect, yet the pursuit to unify them has never stopped. This paradox points to a fundamental
problem, or incomplete understanding of the method and how its performance is related to inven-
tory levels. From this suggestion it would appear that the level of inventory in a system is related
to the protection of the system going out of bounds and is some form of an axiom. If this discrep-
ancy can be understood and its effects explained there is room for improvement given the additional
understanding gained from the resolution of this conflict.
This contradiction is not documented in literature. Given the prevalent modelling and analysis
methods it does not come as a surprise. There exists room for expansion on this problem and its
implications alone. This thesis does, however, not provide the platform to explore this avenue to
the extent that does justice to the problem. It does, however, demonstrate that model checking is
capable of providing insights into well-known and widely implemented solutions. One of the reasons
2JIT is one of the fundamental pillars upon which the Lean Production philosophy is built.
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for the use of model checking was to expose subtle and inconspicuous flaws in processes. In this
simple example, a serious3 defect was exposed in aone of the most widely implemented production
protocols globally.
7.4.3 Conclusion
CAM showed that it is capable of delving into the heart of complex problems, reducing them to simple
focus points: the identification of potential solutions, and the verification of these solutions. It also
showed how it is capable of a high level of abstraction so that these solutions can be verified. The
abstraction is done with a common set of safety and liveness properties that makes different solutions
directly comparable to each other. This comparison is based on criteria that are causally related back
to all the main concerns in the system. In doing so it places the power of model checking in the
hands of business process modellers. It is also capable of exposing logical conflicts and encompasses
both policy philosophies and actual implementation. This provides a platform to investigate held
assumptions regarding business processes that would otherwise be left unchecked.
3From a logical point of view JIT is not capable of delivering on time. This indicates that greater on time deliveries can
be achieved with S-DBR when compared to JIT; this at lower inventory levels. both primary objectives of JIT.
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DISCUSSION
W
E now ask ourselves, what would CAM allow us to do tomorrow that we cannot do with
business process modelling methodologies today? The answer to this question encapsu-
lates the reason for the use of CAM and the benefit it will bring to a system.
8.1 Speed
Models built with CAM are highly abstract, and do not contain computational or operational details.
It only concerns itself with the process logic that the system uses to execute. As a result, the models
are small, and even models of large processes can be constructed in a minimal amount of time1.
No time studies are needed to determine model parameters, since only logic governs the opera-
tion. This further reduces the modelling period because no process performance data is required for
the construction of the model. In addition to this, many components in a business processes func-
tions on the same logic. Therefore the logic is generic; it can be reused, instead of having to establish
the performance parameters of every individual process, as one would have to do in simulation.
8.2 Accuracy
The use CAM at the outset of an improvement or change initiative tests the logic of the solution. In as
much as it does not rely on statistical data to draw conclusions, it is solely focused on the suitability
of the solution.
1Once familiar with model construction techniques the creation time for some of the models depicted in this thesis
were completed in a matter of hours.
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Parameter tweaking can be used to skew model behaviour in favour of certain solutions, or this
can be merely due to an incorrect interpretation of the statistical significance. Taking the S-DBR ver-
sus JIT example, it would be possible to construct models that would show that JIT is faster than
S-DBR in terms of execution, and vice versa. The use of CAM resolves this problem. It shows, in-
dependently from sub-process performance, which solutions have a superior ability to address the
problem at hand. In the case of JIT and S-DBR, both are capable of healing themselves, but only
S-DBR is capable of always delivering on time, form a logical point of view at least.
Armed with the proof of the logical soundness and superiority of a solution provided by verifica-
tion, it is now possible to simulate the solution and tweak the variables so that performance of the
final implementation is maximised. The result is therefore an optimised and verified solution, which
compares favourably with normal unverified simulation solutions.
8.3 Direct solution comparison
Arguably there are many methods [33] that can be used to compare proposed solutions with each
other. The benefit of CAM over other methods is that it ensures a common measurement for all
proposed solutions. The measurement is the common problem all solutions should address if im-
plemented. This problem is used as a measurement, and all models must be able to address this
problem provably. If this was not possible, model checking could not be used to compare solutions
with each other. This common measurement is inherent to the method and not optional, as is would
be under normal modelling situations. A modeller will not be put in the position that would force
him to choose between two models, each with its own unique set of advantages and disadvantages,
and base his choice on a perceived, unproven, or a correlated measure of benefit.
8.4 CAM benefits
To summarise and answer what CAM allows us to do tomorrow what we could not do today:
CAM allows for the quicker modelling of business processes, as well as providing problem specific
and proven solutions in a manner not possible with simulation or other techniques. A combination
that is not available in other methodologies today.
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CONCLUSIONS
A
T the outset of this thesis the aim was to verify business processes with model checking. The
reason was to prove the behavioural properties of proposed or implemented protocols to
gain a better understanding of their operational dynamics. Especially dynamics left unob-
served if evaluated with normal testing and simulation methods. A point of particular interest was
the behaviour and testing of concurrent solutions, a field in which more and more business processes
now operate in, and an area left sufficiently under-addressed by mainstream simulation.
Two obstacles in the way of the application of model checking to business processes are the lack of
formality in business processes and the difficulty of abstracting verifiable models from complex and
informal systems. This problem was addressed with the creation of CAM, which combines the Logical
Thinking Process as an abstraction tool-set with the power and capabilities of model checking to meet
the original objective.
In the examples of Chapters 6 and 7 we showed that the Logical Thinking Process can transform
complex and heterogeneous systems into homogeneously formal and verifiable models. The use of
the Logical Thinking Process not only provided abstract models of verifiable complexity, but also
supplied the requirements necessary for the verification of the models. These requirements provided
a common measurement matrix that is used for multiple potential solutions to the same problem,
and as a result renders a means of direct comparison between solution alternatives.
An example of this is the common measurement used to compare the S-DBR protocol against
JIT. Both methods have different backgrounds, approaches and operational philosophies giving rise
to disjointed measurement1 objectives. The Logical Thinking Process provided a common measure-
1S-DBR focuses on buffer and bottleneck performance, whilst JIT strives to eliminate waste like inventory, setup times
and overproduction.
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ment matrix for both solutions from a common set of objectives, allowing them to be compared di-
rectly with each other with the same measurements.
Providing model checking with these abstract and verifiable models allowed the business pro-
cesses to be verified and have their behavioural properties formally proven. This process verified the
known properties of these implemented and studied solutions, as well as demonstrated new proper-
ties not possible with other methods2.
These properties were shown in Chapters 6 and 7 by means of the following listed examples. The
demonstrable modelling and prediction of the bullwhip phenomenon in a supply chain. This model
also showed the connection between lead times and order frequency with regard to the magnitude of
the bullwhip effect. Chapter 7 demonstrated and verified the self-healing properties of S-DBR and JIT;
attributes proven with the use of model checking for the first time. In the process we also showed that
the performance of the JIT protocol is independent from the amount of WIP in the system from a tem-
poral logic point of view. This raises questions regarding the governing principals and assumptions
that are used in Lean manufacturing and TPS3. These assumptions and nuances are not necessarily
detectable using other techniques.
The examples demonstrated that new insights can be obtained into the well-known and studied
methods with the use of model checking. These insights are obtainable even with the use of highly
abstract models. This shows that nuances and intricacies of procedures are detectable with model
checking in a way that has not been possible with the current business process analysis methods.
9.1 Future work
The Logical Thinking Process forms part of a greater improvement and implementation strategy
within TOC. In this work only a subsection of the complete process was used. It would therefore
be possible to expand CAM and integrate model checking further with the Logical Thinking Process
allowing for the verification of the both necessary as well as the sufficiency assumptions.
Given the results that have been obtained in the verification of the S-DBR, JIT and the bullwhip
effect, it should provide new insights into the behaviour of standard and current solutions. Further-
more, it would be interesting to explore the apparent anomaly of the independence of WIP and pro-
cess performance of the JIT protocol in more detail.
Having a usable tool for the analysis and verification of concurrent business processes, it would
provide grounds for the investigation on how the alteration of current process and design techniques
should change given the availability of model checking tools. Additionally, this could be employed to
investigate how these tools can be used in the development and implementation of new processes,
as well as to measure the benefits that they bring in tangible and quantifiable terms.
2Methods such as simulation and testing.
3The Toyota Production System.
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PROMELA CODE FOR BANK EXAMPLE IN CHAPTER 5
1
/* The Model of the Bank process without an ATM
3 Created 9/09/2009
Jock Odendaal
5 */
7 /* Definition of state variables */
9 #define Idle 1
#define Bank 2
11 #define ATM 3
#define Wait 4
13
bool p
15
17 never {
do
19 ::p -> break
::else
21 od
}
23
25 active proctype BankATM(){
27 bool Need = 0;
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bool BankAvailable = 1;
29 byte State = Idle;
p = 0;
31
33 do
:: if
35 ::(State==Idle)->
if
37 ::(Need && BankAvailable) -> State = Bank;
::(Need && !BankAvailable) -> State = Wait;
39 ::else
fi;
41 ::(State==Bank) -> State = Idle;
::(State==Wait) -> p=1;
43 if
:: (BankAvailable) -> State = Bank;
45 :: else
fi;
47 fi
::Need = 1
49 ::Need = 0
::BankAvailable = 1
51 ::BankAvailable = 0
od
53
}
Listing A.1: PROMELA code for the FSM in Figure 5.12 of the bank example
1
/* The Model of the Bank process with an ATM
3 Created 9/09/2009
Jock Odendaal
5 */
7 /* Definition of state variables */
9 #define Idle 1
#define Bank 2
11 #define ATM 3
#define Wait 4
13
bool p
15
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17 never {
do
19 ::p -> break
::else
21 od
}
23
25 active proctype BankATM(){
27 bool Need = 0;
bool BankAvailable = 1;
29 bool ATMAvailable = 1;
byte State = Idle;
31 p = 0;
33
do
35 :: if
::(State==Idle)->
37 if
::(Need && BankAvailable) -> State = Bank;
39 ::(Need && ATMAvailable) -> State = ATM;
::(Need && !ATMAvailable && !BankAvailable)
41 -> State = Wait;
::else
43 fi;
::(State==Bank) -> State = Idle;
45 ::(State==ATM) -> State = Idle;
::(State==Wait) -> p=1;
47 if
:: (BankAvailable) -> State = Bank;
49 :: (ATMAvailable) -> State = ATM;
:: else
51 fi;
fi
53 ::Need = 1
::Need = 0
55 ::BankAvailable = 1
::BankAvailable = 0
57 od
59 }
Listing A.2: PROMELA code for the FSM in Figure 5.13 of the bank example
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PROMELA CODE FOR Sa
/* This module is to demonstrate the basic consept of bullwhip
2 within an ordenary supply chain
Created by Jock Odendaal
4 11 November 2007
*/
6
/* Definision of the state variables that will be used in the
8 if Statements*/
#define RecieveOrder 1
10 #define RecieveStock 2
#define OrderInventory 3
12 #define Deliver 4
#define Idle 5
14 #define StockLevel 5
#define p (JobNo <= 15)
16
/* Definition of personal varialbes*/
18 mtype = { order, delivery };
byte JobNo;
20
never { /* ![]p */
22 T0_init:
if
24 :: (! ((p))) -> goto accept_all
:: (1) -> goto T0_init
26 fi;
accept_all:
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28 skip
}
30
32
proctype node(chan cl, sup)
34 {
byte State;
36 byte Current;
short Stock;
38 byte Temp;
byte Ship;
40 short StockOrderAmount;
State = Idle;
42 Stock = 5;
do
44 :: if
:: (State == Idle) -> /* Idle state if
46 there is no work */
atomic{
48 if
::cl?order (Current)->
50 d_step{
State = RecieveOrder;
52 printf("Recived Order of:
%d\n" ,Current );
54 }
::sup?order (Current)->
56 d_step{
State = RecieveStock;
58 printf("Stock is %d\n",Stock )
}
60 ::true;
d_step{
62 State = OrderInventory;
}
64 fi;
}
66 :: (State == RecieveStock)->
d_step{
68 Stock = Stock + Current;
State = Idle;
70 }
:: (State == RecieveOrder)->
72 atomic{
if
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74 :: (Current > Stock)->
d_step{
76 if
::(Stock <= 0)->
78 Stock = Stock-Current;
Ship = 0;
80 ::(Stock > 0)->
Ship = Stock;
82 Stock = Stock -Current;
fi;
84 printf("Stock is: %d\n",Stock);
State = Idle;
86 printf("Shipped to client: %d\n", Ship);
}
88 cl!order, Ship;
:: (Current <= Stock) ->
90 d_step{
Stock = Stock - Current;
92 State = Idle;
printf("We Shiped: %d\n",Current);
94 }
cl!order, Current;
96 fi;
}
98 :: (State == OrderInventory)->
atomic{
100 d_step{
StockOrderAmount = StockLevel - Stock;
102 State = Idle;
printf("Ordering Inventory to the value of:
104 %d\n",StockOrderAmount)
}
106 sup!order, StockOrderAmount;
}
108 fi
od
110 }
112 proctype manufacture(chan manu)
{
114 do
::if
116 ::manu?order (JobNo)->manu!order, JobNo;
fi;
118 od;
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120 }
122 proctype client(chan customer)
{
124 byte Temp;
do
126 :: customer!order, (6);
:: customer!order, (5);
128 :: customer!order, (4);
:: customer!order, (3);
130 ::if
::customer?order(Temp)
132 fi;
od;
134 }
136 init
{
138 chan num[10] = [0] of {mtype, byte}
atomic
140 {
run client(num[0]);
142 run manufacture(num[5]);
run node(num[0], num[1]);
144 run node(num[1], num[5]);
146 }
}
Listing B.1: Sa PROMELA code
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PROMELA CODE FOR Sb
1 /* Definition of the state variables that will
be used in the If Statements*/
3 #define RecieveOrder 1
#define RecieveStock 2
5 #define OutOfStock 3
#define Deliver 4
7 #define Idle 5
#define p (JobNo <= 6)
9
/* Definition of personal variables*/
11 mtype = { order, delivery };
byte JobNo;
13
never { /* ![]p */
15 T0_init:
if
17 :: (! ((p))) -> goto accept_all
:: (1) -> goto T0_init
19 fi;
accept_all:
21 skip
}
23
proctype node(chan cl, sup)
25 {
byte State;
27 byte Current;
80
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short Stock;
29 byte Temp;
State = Idle;
31 Stock = 6;
do
33 :: if
:: (State == Idle) -> /* Idle state if there is no work */
35 if
::cl?order (Current)->
37 d_step{
State = RecieveOrder;
39 /* printf("Recieved Order of: %d\n" ,Current );
*/}
41 ::sup?order (Current)->
d_step{
43 Stock = Stock + Current;
printf("Stock is %d\n",Stock )
45 }
fi;
47 :: (State == RecieveOrder)->
if
49 :: (Current > Stock)->
51 d_step{
Temp = Current - Stock;
53 State = Idle;
printf("Out of stock ordered: %d\n",Temp, Stock)
55 }
sup!order, Temp;
57 :: (Current <= Stock) ->
d_step{
59 Stock = Stock - Current;
State = Idle;
61 /*printf("Ordered Replacement stock: %d\n",Current)
*/}
63 sup!order, Current;
cl!order, Current;
65 fi
fi
67 od
}
69
proctype manufacture(chan manu)
71 {
do
73 ::if
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::manu?order (JobNo)->manu!order, JobNo;
75 printf("manufactured : %d\n",JobNo)
fi;
77 od;
79 }
81 proctype client(chan customer)
{
83 byte Scratch;
do
85 :: customer!order, 6; printf("Ordered 6\n")
:: customer!order, 5; printf("Ordered 5\n")
87 :: customer!order, 4; printf("Ordered 4\n")
:: customer!order, 3; printf("Ordered 3\n")
89 :: customer!order, 2; printf("Ordered 2\n")
:: customer!order, 1; printf("Ordered 1\n")
91 ::if
::customer?order(Scratch) -> printf(" Received order of")
93 fi;
od;
95 }
97 init
{
99 chan num[10] = [0] of {mtype, byte}
atomic
101 {
run client(num[0]);
103 run manufacture(num[5]);
/* run node(num[0], num[5]);
105 */ run node(num[0], num[1]);
run node(num[1], num[2]);
107 run node(num[2], num[3]);
run node(num[3], num[5]);
109 }
}
Listing C.1: Sb PROMELA code
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SPIN RESULTS USED IN CHAPTER 6
This appendix contains the output of the various verification runs described in Chapter 6.
(Spin Version 5.1.6 -- 9 May 2008)
2 + Partial Order Reduction
4 Full statespace search for:
never claim +
6 assertion violations + (if within scope of claim)
cycle checks - (disabled by -DSAFETY)
8 invalid end states - (disabled by never claim)
10 State-vector 128 byte, depth reached 8290, errors: 0
437923 states, stored
12 73811 states, matched
511734 transitions (= stored+matched)
14 5 atomic steps
hash conflicts: 39851 (resolved)
16
61.094 memory usage (Mbyte)
18
unreached in proctype node
20 line 75, state 33, "-end-"
(1 of 33 states)
22 unreached in proctype manufacture
line 86, state 9, "-end-"
24 (1 of 9 states)
unreached in proctype client
83
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26 line 102, state 20, "-end-"
(1 of 20 states)
28 unreached in proctype :init:
(0 of 8 states)
30
pan: elapsed time 1.14 seconds
32 pan: rate 384142.98 states/second
Theodore:BullwhipSpin jock$ cc -DSAFETY -o pan pan.c
34 Theodore:BullwhipSpin jock$ ./pan
pan: invalid end state (at depth 51)
36 pan: wrote BullSupply2.trail
38 (Spin Version 5.1.6 -- 9 May 2008)
Warning: Search not completed
40 + Partial Order Reduction
42 Full statespace search for:
never claim - (none specified)
44 assertion violations +
cycle checks - (disabled by -DSAFETY)
46 invalid end states +
48 State-vector 100 byte, depth reached 53, errors: 1
42 states, stored
50 11 states, matched
53 transitions (= stored+matched)
52 3 atomic steps
hash conflicts: 0 (resolved)
54
2.501 memory usage (Mbyte)
56
58 pan: elapsed time 0 seconds
Listing D.1: SPIN output for Sa
(Spin Version 5.1.6 -- 9 May 2008)
+ Partial Order Reduction
Full statespace search for:
never claim +
assertion violations + (if within scope of claim)
cycle checks - (disabled by -DSAFETY)
invalid end states - (disabled by never claim)
State-vector 128 byte, depth reached 8290, errors: 0
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437923 states, stored
73811 states, matched
511734 transitions (= stored+matched)
5 atomic steps
hash conflicts: 39851 (resolved)
61.094 memory usage (Mbyte)
unreached in proctype node
line 75, state 33, "-end-"
(1 of 33 states)
unreached in proctype manufacture
line 86, state 9, "-end-"
(1 of 9 states)
unreached in proctype client
line 102, state 20, "-end-"
(1 of 20 states)
unreached in proctype :init:
(0 of 8 states)
pan: elapsed time 1.15 seconds
pan: rate 380802.61 states/second
Listing D.2: SPIN output for Sb numbers
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PROMELA CODE FOR S-DBR
/* This is the spin model of the buffer of that is used in TOC
2 Created 24/04/2007
Jock Odendaal
4 */
6 /* Definition of the state variables that will be used in
the if Statements*/
8 #define Idle 1
#define Busy 2
10 #define Evaluate 3
#define Replace 4
12 #define QState 5
#define StartJobInQ 6
14 #define p (JobNo <= 1)
16 /* Definition of personal variables*/
mtype = { job, drum };
18 byte JobNo;
20 /*chan tp = [0] of {mtype, byte};
chan fp = [0] of {mtype, byte};
22 chan num[10] = [0] of {mtype, byte};*/
24
never { /* <>[]!p */
26 T0_init:
if
86
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28 :: (! ((p))) -> goto accept_S4
:: (1) -> goto T0_init
30 fi;
accept_S4:
32 if
:: (! ((p))) -> goto accept_S4
34 fi;
}
36
38 /* This process is the sole purpose of version. This is the
fundamental building-block of the model.It models the basic
40 protocol for each workstation in both DBR and SDBR and had to
be built before the rest of the model
42 */
proctype process(chan tp, fp)
44 {
byte State;
46 byte Temp;
byte current;
48 byte Qed;
State = Idle;
50 do
:: if
52 :: (State == Idle) -> /* Idle state if there is no work
to be done*/
54 tp?job (current);
d_step{
56 State = Busy;
current--;
58 printf("Recived Job: %d\n" ,current );
}
60 :: (State == Busy) -> /* Only one job is at the work
station and it is processed*/
62 if
::fp!job (current) -> State = Idle;
64 ::tp?job (Qed) -> State = Evaluate;
fi;
66
:: (State == Evaluate) -> /* If a new job arrives, it
68 has to be decided if it more
important than the current
70 one*/
if
72 :: (current > Qed) ->
d_step{
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74 current--;
Qed--;
76 State = Replace;
printf("Recived Job: %d\n",Qed);
78 printf("Have Job %d\n",current);
}
80 /* <= only used during v1 for simulation of how a
process works*/
82 :: (current <= Qed) ->
d_step{
84 State = QState;
Qed--;
86 printf("Recived Job: %d\n",Qed);
printf("Have Job %d\n",current);
88 }
fi;
90
:: (State == Replace) ->
92 d_step{
Temp = current;
94 current = Qed;
Qed = Temp;
96 }
State = QState;
98 printf("Swop jobs\n")
100 :: (State == QState) ->
if
102 ::fp!job, current->
State = StartJobInQ;
104 fi;
106 :: (State == StartJobInQ) ->
d_step{
108 current = Qed;
current--;
110 State = Busy;
}
112 fi;
od;
114 }
116
118 proctype seed(chan tp)
{
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120 do
:: tp!job, 6;
122 :: tp!job, 5;
od;
124 }
126 proctype sink(chan fp)
{
128
do
130 :: fp?job, JobNo;
printf("Jobdone %d\n", JobNo);
132 printf(" Value of P %d\n", p)
od;
134
}
136
init
138 {
chan num[10] = [0] of {mtype, byte}
140 atomic
{
142 run seed(num[7]);
run sink(num[0]);
144 run process(num[7], num[2]);
run process(num[2], num[3]);
146 run process(num[3], num[0]);
148 }
}
Listing E.1: S-DBR PROMELA code
1 (Spin Version 5.1.6 -- 9 May 2008)
+ Partial Order Reduction
3
Full statespace search for:
5 never claim +
assertion violations + (if within scope of claim)
7 cycle checks - (disabled by -DSAFETY)
invalid end states - (disabled by never claim)
9
State-vector 100 byte, depth reached 9999, errors: 0
11 2743594 states, stored
2900371 states, matched
13 5643965 transitions (= stored+matched)
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3 atomic steps
15 hash conflicts: 3282938 (resolved)
17 303.274 memory usage (Mbyte)
19 unreached in proctype process
line 106, state 53, "-end-"
21 (1 of 53 states)
unreached in proctype seed
23 line 118, state 8, "-end-"
(1 of 8 states)
25 unreached in proctype sink
line 129, state 7, "-end-"
27 (1 of 7 states)
unreached in proctype :init:
29 (0 of 6 states)
31 pan: elapsed time 8.35 seconds
pan: rate 328574.13 states/second
Listing E.2: SPIN output for the S-DBR example
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PROMELA MODELS AND VERIFICATION RESULTS FOR
JIT
/* The Model of JIT Manufacturing protocol 13 January 2009
2 */
4 /* Definition of state variables */
6 #define Idle 1
#define Production 2
8 #define Produce 3
#define Wait 4
10
bool p
12
never { /* []<>p */
14 T0_init:
if
16 :: ((p)) -> goto accept_S9
:: (1) -> goto T0_init
18 fi;
accept_S9:
20 if
:: (1) -> goto T0_init
22 fi;
}
24
91
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26
proctype JIT(chan in, out)
28 {
bool Work = 0;
30 byte State = Idle;
32 do
::if
34 ::(State==Idle)->
if
36 ::atomic{nfull(out) -> State = Production};
::else
38 fi;
::(State==Production) ->
40 if
:: (empty(in) && nfull(out)) -> State = Wait;
42 :: (nempty(in) && nfull(out))-> State = Produce;
:: full(out) -> State = Idle
44 fi;
::(State==Produce) ->
46 in?Work;
out!Work;
48 State = Production;
::(State==Wait) -> p=1;
50 if
:: atomic{nempty(in) -> State = Produce};
52 :: else->
fi;
54 fi;
od
56
}
58
proctype raw(chan out)
60 {
do
62 :: nfull(out) -> out!1;
od
64 }
66 proctype consume(chan in)
{
68 do
:: atomic{nempty(in) -> in?_};
70 :: atomic{empty(in) -> p=1};
:: else;
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72 od
}
74
init
76 {
chan num[10] = [3] of {bool};
78 p=0;
atomic
80 {
run raw(num[0]);
82 num[0]!1;
num[0]!1;
84 num[0]!1;
num[1]!1;
86 num[1]!1;
num[1]!1;
88 num[2]!1;
num[2]!1;
90 num[2]!1;
num[3]!1;
92 num[3]!1;
num[3]!1;
94 run consume(num[3]);
run JIT(num[0], num[1]);
96 run JIT(num[1], num[2]);
run JIT(num[2], num[3]);
98 }
}
Listing F.1: JIT PROMELA code
1 hint: this search is more efficient if pan.c is compiled -DSAFETY
warning: for p.o. reduction to be valid the never claim
3 must be stutter-invariant
(never claims generated from LTL formulae are stutter-invariant)
5 pan: claim violated! (at depth 561)
pan: wrote JITMK1.trail
7
(Spin Version 5.2.2 -- 7 September 2009)
9 Warning: Search not completed
+ Partial Order Reduction
11
Full statespace search for:
13 never claim +
assertion violations + (if within scope of claim)
15 acceptance cycles - (not selected)
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invalid end states - (disabled by never claim)
17
State-vector 160 byte, depth reached 561, errors: 1
19 271 states, stored
174 states, matched
21 445 transitions (= stored+matched)
20 atomic steps
23 hash conflicts: 0 (resolved)
25 4.653 memory usage (Mbyte)
27
pan: elapsed time 0.01 seconds
Listing F.2: SPIN output for the JIT model
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